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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over the judgments and decisions of 
the Utah Court of Appeals generally and over the decision rendered by the Court 
of Appeals in this matter, pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-
102. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues preserved by the Utah Supreme Court in its Order, dated January 
13, 2011, granting Appellant, Henry Day Ford, Inc.'s ("HDF") request for a Writ 
of Certiorari are: 
(1) Whether a majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred 
in reversing the district court's determination that the parties abandoned their 
contracts and that Appellee, Tom Watkins ("Watkins") waived his rights under the 
contracts. 
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was 
a latent ambiguity in the contracts and that HDF breached the contracts. 
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district 
court's determination that Watkins failed to mitigate his damages. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On certiorari review, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, not the decision of the district court." Colosimo v. Roman Catholic 
Bishop. 156 P.3d 806 (Utah 2007). Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its 
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assessment of the issues of abandonment, waiver, latent ambiguity, breach of 
contract, and failure to mitigate present questions of law that the Supreme Court 
review for correctness. The correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision turns on 
whether that court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the 
appropriate standard of review. State of Utah v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230 (Utah 2002); 
State v. Visser. 22 P.3d 1242 (Utah 2000). "We review the decision of the court of 
appeals for correctness, and give no deference to its conclusions of law". Wardley 
Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99112, 61 P.3d 1009. 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion is set forth as: Watkins v. Henry Day Ford, 
2010 UT App 243 (Utah App. 2010). Attached at Appendix 1. The Trial Court's 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law of the trial court are attached hereto as 
Appendix 2. 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no controlling or determinative constitutional and/or statutory 
provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a civil case seeking to establish whether: (a) HDF beached certain 
Motor Vehicle Contracts ("Contacts") entered into by the parties; (b) the Contracts 
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were abandoned by the parties; (c) the parties waived their rights in the Contracts; 
and (d) Watkins failed to mitigate his damages. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower 
Courts 
Watkins filed a complaint against HDF claiming breach of contract, specific 
performance, and unjust enrichment in the Third District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County on July 1, 2005. The case proceeded to a bench trial only on 
Watkins' breach of contract claim. The trial court ruled in favor of HDF finding 
(1) HDF had not breached the Contracts, (2) the parties had waived their rights 
under the Contracts, (3) the parties had abandoned the Contracts, and (4) Watkins 
failed to mitigate his damages. Based upon these findings the trial court dismissed 
Watkins' Complaint, and awarded HDF its costs and attorney's fees. (See 
Appendix 2.) 
Watkins appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. The case was poured over to 
the Court of Appeals. This matter was argued before the Court of Appeals on June 
23, 2010. The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on September 2, 2010, in which 
it reversed the trial court finding HDF had breached the Contracts, reversed the 
trial court's finding that the parties had abandoned the Contracts, reversed the trial 
court's finding that the parties had waived their rights under the Contracts, vacated 
the trial court's mitigation determination, and reversed the award of attorney's fees 
and costs to HDF. HDF petitioned this Court for a Writ of Certiorari to correct the 
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Court of Appeals' ruling for the reasons set forth below. This Court granted 
HDF's Petition for Writ of Certiorari on January 13, 2011. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. At trial it was undisputed that Watkins was very familiar with the 
automobile industry, buying and selling vehicles, and preparing the Contracts at 
issue in this case since he had been an owner of one or more motor vehicle 
dealerships since 1989 and has been involved in the retail automobile business in 
various capacities since 1968. (Findings of Fact Tfl.) 
2. In 2002, Ford Motor Company ("Ford") announced that it was going 
to reintroduce and manufacture the Ford GT 40. Watkins specifically desired to 
purchase two (2) Ford GT 40 automobiles. (Findings of Fact %L and |3.) 
3. Watkins went to HDF for the purpose of purchasing Ford GT 40s 
and HDF agreed it would sell Watkins two (2) GT 40 automobiles if HDF was 
allocated the vehicles. (Findings of Fact ^4, [^8, and |9.) 
4 . HDF prepared two (2) written standard Motor Vehicle Contracts of 
Sale ("Contracts") dated March 4, 2002, for Ford GT 40 automobiles. (Findings of 
Fact f^lO.) The Contracts were executed by Watkins and HDF. (Findings of Fact 
f 11; copies of the Contracts (Trial Exhibits P1-P4 and D1-D2) are attached hereto 
as Appendix 3 hereto.) 
5. Watkins testified that he knew that the Contracts needed to be 
prepared accurately and completely. (Trial Tr.l 69:17-19.) 
6. Watkins reviewed the Contracts, found the Contracts to be accurate, 
and signed both written Contracts. (Findings of Fact 113.) 
7. As required by the Contracts, Watkins tendered $1,000.00 for each 
automobile and HDF accepted the funds as a deposit. (Findings of Fact 115.) 
Watkins testified that deposits were made to "secure the deal". (Trial Tr. 77:21-
24.) The $1,000.00 deposits were part of the Contracts (Trial Tr. 78:23-25) and 
Steve Kersey, the HDF employee who prepared the Contracts, testified that the 
Contracts would not have been written by the parties without the deposit. (Trial 
Tr. 79:15-19.) 
8. After the Contracts were signed, Watkins called HDF and requested 
that the Contracts be modified to include the purchase price of 'MSRP', which 
modification HDF agreed to make. (Findings of Fact 119; Appendix 3.) At no 
time in 2002, did Watkins ask to purchase a Ford GT, or any other Ford model 
vehicle other than a Ford GT 40, or, at any time thereafter, request any other 
modification of the Contracts. (Findings of Fact 122.) 
9. Jeremy Day, in December of 2002, contacted Ford to inquire if HDF 
would be allotted the subject vehicles. (Findings of Fact 124.) 
1
 All references to the Trial Transcript ('Trial Tr.) are attached collectively at 
Appendix 4. 
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10. Jeremy Day, manager of HDF, testified that holding Watkins' 
deposit for ten (10) months without being allocated a Ford GT 40 or any indication 
that HDF would be allocated such a vehicle was not reasonable and that HDF had 
never held a deposit for such a long period of time. (Trial Tr. 141:16-23.) 
11. Ford indicated to Mr. Day, in effect, that HDF would not be allotted 
any Ford GT 40's unless HDF won the Ford President's Award or Ford's National 
Car and Truck Share Award. (Findings of Fact 125.) 
12. HDF had not, in its 40 year history, received either the President's 
Award or National Share Award from Ford. (Findings of Fact 1J26.) 
13. Based upon Ford's representation, HDF believed that it would not be 
allocated a Ford GT40 (Trial Tr. 139:13-15) and on December 31, 2002, HDF 
returned Watkins's $2,000.00 deposit with a letter which stated: "[ejnclosed 
please find a check for the refund of deposit on your vehicle order. We regret to 
inform you that our allocation is not going to allow us to receive this vehicle." 
(Findings of Fact ^ [27.) 
14. HDF returned Watkins's check in good faith and based upon the 
reasonable belief that it would not be allotted any Ford GT 40's. (Findings of Fact 
141.) 
15. Watkins negotiated the return of his deposit without objection or 
reservation and thereafter, made no attempt to communicate with HDF regarding 
the Contracts until June 2005. (Findings of Fact [^28.) 
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16. In February 2004, over two years after Watkins accepted the return 
of his deposit, HDF learned that it would be allocated a Ford GT based upon 
HDF's being awarded the Share of the Nation Award for the 2003 sales year. 
(Finding of Fact 129.) In April 2004, HDF was notified by Ford that HDF would 
receive the President's Award and would be allocated another Ford GT. (Finding 
of Fact 130.) 
17. HDF received a GT automobile on May 31, 2005 (Finding of Fact 
132) and a second GT on July 20, 2005 (Finding of Fact 134). In June of 2005, 
Watkins, for the first time, demanded HDF sell him a Ford GT even though the 
Contracts specifically provided for the purchase of Ford GT 40 vehicles. 
(Findings of Fact 135.) 
18. The trial court found that Watkins, by his actions, unequivocally 
demonstrated his intent to relinquish his rights to purchase the contracted Ford GT 
40 automobiles from HDF. (Findings of Fact 142.) 
19. The trial court concluded that the Contracts entered into by the 
parties were clear and unambiguous and were intended to be the final and 
complete expression of the parties' bargain (Conclusions of Law 11), the Contracts 
were integrated agreements (Conclusions of Law 12), and the Contracts provided 
that HDF was to sell to Watkins a Ford GT 40 (Conclusions of Law 14). 
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20. The trial court concluded that HDF had not been allocated a Ford GT 
40 and, as such, HDF did not breach the parties' Contract. (Conclusions of Law 
115.) 
21. The trial court concluded that the return of Watkins's deposit by 
HDF represented conduct inconsistent with the continued existence of the 
Contracts. Likewise, Watkins's negotiation of HDF's check in the amount of 
$2,000.00 without reservation or objection constituted conduct inconsistent with 
the continuation of the Contracts. (Conclusions of Law ^ }8.) 
22. The trial court concluded that, based upon the undisputed conduct of 
the parties', the parties abandoned the Contracts. (Conclusions of Law |9.) 
23. The trial court concluded that Watkins' acceptance of the return of 
his deposit and his subsequent inaction demonstrated Watkins' voluntary 
relinquishment of his known rights particularly with Watkins' experience in the 
auto dealership industry and both parties' uncertainty as to when and if HDF 
would receive the contracted vehicles. (Conclusions of Law [^10.) 
24. In the late summer of 2005, HDF offered to sell to Watkins for 
MSRP a Ford GT. (Findings of Fact f38.) 
25. Watkins refused HDF's offer to purchase a Ford GT. (Findings of 
Fact 139.) 
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26. The trial court concluded that Watkins' refusal to purchase the Ford 
GT constituted a failure by Watkins to mitigate his damages. (Findings of Fact 
139.) 
27. Watkins appealed the trial court's ruling This matter was argued 
before the Court of Appeals on June 23, 2010. 
28. The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on September 2, 2010, in 
which it reversed the trial court finding HDF had breached the Contracts based 
upon a latent ambiguity, reversed the trial court's finding that the parties had 
abandoned the Contracts, reversed the trial court's finding that the parties had 
waived their rights under the Contracts, vacated the trial court's mitigation 
determination, and reversed the award of attorney's fees and costs to HDF. 
29. HDF petitioned this Court for a Writ of Certiorari to correct the 
Court of Appeals' erroneous ruling reversing the trial court's findings and 
judgment for the reasons set forth below. This Court granted HDF's Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari on January 13, 2011. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The clear and undisputed actions of they unequivocally intended to abandon 
the Contracts. The return by HDF of Watkins' deposit, and Watkins' negotiation 
of the deposit and Watkins' failure to contact HDF after receipt of the returned 
deposit demonstrates that the parties intended to, and did, abandon the contracts. 
9 
The actions of HDF and Watkins resulted in a mutual abandonment of the 
Contracts by the parties. The trial court's finding of abandonment were supported 
by the evidence and testimony at trial. 
Watkins' as an experienced automobile dealer, was very familiar with the 
Contracts which were entered into by the parties. Watkins knew his rights under 
the Contracts. Watkins demonstrated, by his conduct of cashing the check without 
reservation or comment, that he intended to waive his rights under the Contracts. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial Court that there was no facial 
ambiguity in the Contracts. The Contracts executed by the parties were standard 
form contracts used by automobile dealers in Utah for years. The Contracts 
specifically provided, as requested by Watkins, that Watkins wanted to purchase 
Ford GT 40 automobiles and HDF agreed to sell to Watkins Ford GT 40 
automobiles if HDF received said vehicle. The Contracts were integrated 
Contracts and contained the entire understanding of the parties. HDF did not 
breach the Contracts. The Contracts provided that HDF would sell to Watkins a 
Ford GT 40. It is undisputed that HDF never had a Ford GT 40 to sell to Watkins. 
Watkins failed to mitigate his damages. HDF offered to sell to Watkins a 
Ford GT for MSRP. Watkins, however refused to HDF's offer to purchase the 
automobile. 
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HDF has not breached the Contracts and, as such, HDF is entitled to 
recover its costs and attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN 
REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING 
THAT THE PARTIES5 ABANDONED THE 
CONTRACTS, 
A. The Actions of The Parties Demonstrate that Both Parties 
had Abandoned the Contracts. 
The term 'abandonment' "means the intentional relinquishment of one's 
rights in the contract" and to nullify contract rights, "there must be a clear and 
unequivocal showing of such abandonment." Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT 
App. 243, 166 P.3d 639, citing Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah 
1980) (quotations omitted). 
If there is a dispute whether abandonment has occurred, "it is usually a 
question of fact to be determined from the circumstances of the particular case, 
which include not only nonperformance, but also expressions of intent and other 
actions of the parties". Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481, 484 
(Utah 1975). In determining those facts and circumstances, the trial court is given 
"considerable latitude and should not be reversed unless the finding is clearly 
erroneous or if this Court is otherwise persuaded that a mistake has been made." 
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See also, Adair v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Utah Rule of 
Civ, P. 52(a). The trial court's findings that the parties abandoned their contract 
will not be reversed "unless we are persuaded that the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the findings. Timpanogos Highlands, 544 P.2d at 484. HDF 
submits that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it set aside the 
ruling of the trial court. 
(1) The Trial Court's Findings were Supported by the 
Evidence and Testimony at Trial. 
In this case, the trial court found that both parties had acted as if they had 
abandoned the Contracts. The trial court's factual findings on this issue include: 
28. Though plaintiff, as noted above is an experienced 
automobile dealer and as such would be very familiar 
with industry practices, he negotiated the return of his 
deposit without objection or reservation of any type. 
Based upon plaintiffs experience, in the auto 
dealership industry, plaintiffs claim that he deposited 
the check because he did not know what to do with the 
check lacks credibility. Plaintiff made no attempt 
whatsoever to communicate any concerns he had with 
the letter and the check, nor made any attempts within 
a reasonable time of receiving the letter and check to 
assert or enforce his contract rights. 
40. Plaintiff, by his acceptance of his deposit without 
reservation, objection, or condition, unequivocally 
demonstrated his abandonment of the Contracts. 
41. Plaintiffs demand that the Contracts be honored 
by defendant over two (2) years after plaintiff accepted 
a return of his deposit is unreasonable. The Court 
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finds that defendant returned plaintiffs check in good 
faith and based upon the reasonable belief they would 
not be allotted any Ford GT 40fs. 
42. Plaintiff, by his actions, unequivocally 
demonstrated his intent to relinquish his rights to 
purchase the subject vehicles from defendant. 
(Findings of Fact ffi[28, 40, 41, 42) 
These findings were supported by the evidence and testimony presented at 
trial as addressed below. As such, the Appellate Court's decision setting aside the 
judgment of the trial court should be reversed. 
(2) Return and Negotiation of the Deposit 
Demonstrates that the Parties Intended to, and did. 
Abandon the Contracts. 
"[A] contract may be [abandoned] by acts or conduct of the parties 
inconsistent with the continued existence of the contract." Harris v. IES Assoc. 
Inc.. 2003 UT App 112, |37, 69 P.3d 297 (internal quotations omitted.) In this 
case, both parties undertook acts inconsistent with the continued existence of the 
Contracts. 
HDF, which is in the business of selling cars, acted inconsistently with the 
existence of the Contracts when it cancelled the Contracts and refunded the 
deposit/cash down given by Watkins as security for the performance of the 
Contracts. Watkins acted inconsistently with the Contracts when he accepted the 
13 
testified that he and Steve Kersey, a HDF salesperson, discussed the President's 
Award in his first meeting at HDF. Watkins testified: 
Q. But you never discussed that [the President's 
Award] with Mr. Kersey [the Henry Day Ford sales 
person] did you sir? 
A. We did talk about the President's Award. 
(Trial Tr. 103:6-8.) 
A. . . . All I [Watkins] know is as I was calling dealers 
from Ogden down to Provo, they made me aware of a 
President's Award and that in some way that 
figured into the allocation. 
Q. And when did that happen, sir? When did they tell 
you that? 
A. In March of '02. 
(Emphasis added.) (Trial Tr. 104:24-25 and 105:1-5.) 
The Appellate Court's ruling that: "There was nothing that would have 
given Watkins any reason to doubt the accuracy or truth of the information relayed 
by Henry Day. And the crucial information regarding nonoccurrence of the 
condition precedent is something that Watkins had no way of independently 
verifying" is clearly not supported by Watkins testimony at trial. In fact, as noted, 
Watkins, as an experienced car dealer, had the means to independently verify the 
information in the letter which accompanied the return of his deposit. 
(3) Mutual Abandonment 
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The parties' actions of mutual abandonment of the Contracts in this case 
amount to a manifestation of mutual assent to rescind the Contracts. See 
generally, Forsyth v. Pendleton. 617 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah 1980) (per curiam) 
("[W]hen the intent to abandon by one party is coupled with the equal intention of 
the other party, such mutual abandonment may under certain circumstances, be 
found to constitute rescission of the contract.") HDF, upon the return of Watkins' 
deposit, considered the Contracts terminated. (Trial Tr. 152:4-6.) The conduct by 
HDF in returning the deposit unequivocally demonstrated HDF's abandonment of 
the Contracts because Watkins' deposits were used to "secure the deal". (Trial Tr. 
77:21-24.). Thus, HDF's action of returning the deposited money was inconsistent 
with the existence of the Contracts. 
The trial court correctly ruled that Watkins acquiesced to HDF's 
abandonment when he accepted the return of his deposit and negotiated the deposit 
check. (Trial Tr. 52:24-25.) Watkins testified that he had completed a number of 
Motor Vehicle Sales Contracts (Trial Tr. 69:9-11.) and knew that the deposits were 
not only important to the contracts but were part of the contracts. (Trial Tr. 79:21-
25). Watkins specifically testified at trial: 
Q. Did you call Henry Day and say, "Keep my check? 
A. No. 




(Trial Tr. 80:5-9.) 
Watkins' conduct of cashing the check and not contacting HDF until June 
2005, over two years after receiving the check, constitutes conduct inconsistent 
with the continued existence of the Contracts. (Trial Tr. 80:7-9.) If Watkins 
wanted to maintain any rights under the Contracts, he could have, and should have, 
refused to cash the check and/or made an inquiry or objection to HDF. However, 
Watkins' negotiation of the deposit demonstrated his agreement to "walk away" 
from the deal. 
Both parties demonstrated by their conduct an unequivocal intent to 
abandon the Contracts. The conclusion by the trial court that the parties 
abandoned the Contract is supported by the evidence and is not clearly erroneous. 
(4) Watkins9 Conduct Demonstrated All of the 
Elements Necessary for a Finding of Abandonment. 
Elements necessary for a finding of abandonment are similar to the 
elements necessary for the finding of a waiver of contractual rights. 
"To constitute waiver and abandonment, there must be an existing right, 
benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it. 
We further clarify that the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct." (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted.) Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Sav. & 
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Loan Ass'n. 857 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah, 1993); Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark. 
755 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah Ct. App.1988) ("Abandonment means the intentional 
relinquishment of onefs rights in the contract; and in order to nullify such rights, 
there must be a clear and unequivocal showing of such abandonment."). 
The Appellate Court's conclusion that abandonment did not occur rests on 
its assertion that Watkins did not intentionally relinquish his rights under the 
Contracts. The Appellate Court addressed the trial court's finding of abandonment 
in section II of its opinion, paragraphs 17-19. The Appellant Court cited Lucky 
Seven Rodeo Corp. V. Clark, 775 .2d 750, 753 (Utah Ct. App. 1088). In Lucky 
Seven Rodeo, it was held: 
Abandonment means the intentional relinquishment of 
one's rights in the contract; and in order to nullify such 
rights, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing 
of such abandonment. 
HDF's return of Watkins' deposit and Watkins' acceptance of the deposit 
and subsequent failure to contact HDF regarding his continued desire to purchase a 
Ford GT 40, distinctly demonstrate that both parties abandoned the Contracts. 
"[t]he intent to abandon . . . need not be shown by the positive testimony of the 
purchaser but may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the purchaser, which 
are clearly inconsistent with the intent to continue". Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 
P.2d358,361. 
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Clearly, Watkins knew his rights under the Contracts. The Appellate Court 
found, as noted above, that "[t]here is simply no evidence whatsoever indicating 
that Watkins knew he still had rights under the contracts at the time he negotiated 
the check refunding his deposit" (Appellate Court Decision ^fl8), contrary to 
Watkins own testimony. Watkins, however, testified that "[he] did discuss and the 
other dealers were aware of the Presidents Award". (Trial Transcript 102:23-
25,103:1-8, 104:24-25, 105:1-5.) Watkins also testified that he and Steve Kersey, 
a HDF salesperson, discussed the President's Award in his first meeting at HDF. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Watkins knew that a Ford award would affect 
what dealerships were allocated a Ford GT 40, Watkins accepted his deposit back 
without objection or inquiry about the status of the President's Award. For the 
Appellate Court to opine that "there is simply no evidence whatsoever indicating 
that Watkins knew he still had a right under the Contracts at the time he negotiated 
the refund of his deposit" is contrary to Watkins' testimony. 
By returning Watkins' deposit, HDF demonstrated its intent not to hold 
Watkins to the Contracts. Watkins clearly and distinctly demonstrated his intent to 
relinquish his rights and thereby abandon the Contracts when he accepted the 
return of his deposit. Watkins specifically testified the $1,000.00 deposits were 
part of the Contracts: 
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Q. ...[Y]ou and Mr. Kersey agreed to the thousand 
dollars [deposit for each GT40]? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the thousand dollars was part of the contract, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
(Trial Tr. 78:20-25.) 
Upon receipt of his $2,000.00 deposit from HDF, Watkins negotiated the 
check without objection or reservation. HDF then had no further contact with 
Watkins for two and half years, until June 2005 when Watkins demanded to buy a 
Ford GT from Henry Day Ford even though Watkins and Henry Day Ford never 
had an agreement referencing a Ford GT. Watkins' own action of depositing the 
check was an affirmative step inconsistent with enforcing his rights under the 
Contracts, therefore constituting an intentional relinquishment of an abandonment 
of the Contracts. Simply put, Watkins did not take any steps in an attempt to 
maintain his rights under the Contracts, and in the absence of any actions 
consistent with preserving his rights under the Contracts, Watkins acquiesced in 
relinquishing his rights. 
The circumstances of this case demonstrate that Watkins abandoned and 
relinquished his right to the Contracts. Thus, the Appellate Court should not have 
reversed unless they were persuaded that the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings of the trial court. However, the evidence, and the trial court's 
factual findings, demonstrate that the parties mutually abandoned the Contracts. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN 
REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DETERMINATION THAT WATKINS WAIVED 
HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONTRACTS. 
Notwithstanding HDF's return of Watkins' deposit in good faith and based 
upon the reasonable belief that HDF would not be allotted any Ford GT 40fs, the 
Appellate Court determined that "there was simply no relinquishment by Watkins 
of a known right". 
The Appellate Court addressed the trial court's finding of waiver in Section 
II of its opinion at paragraphs 17 through 19. The Appellate court cited Soter's, 
Inc. v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 857 P.2d 935 (Utah, 1993), which case 
determines the elements of waiver2. It appears the Appellate Court is again 
obscuring the theory of waiver. 
This Court in Soter's held: 
2
 The Soter's case was referred to the Utah Supreme Court from the United States 
Federal Court for a clear definition of waiver in Utah. Counsel for HDF represented 
Tri-K Contractors, who asserted the waiver argument, in Soter's. During oral 
argument, Justice Zimmerman stated, in effect, with regard to the elements of waiver, 
"It appears that we have over cooked this issue". 
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On this basis, we hold that there is only one legal 
standard required to establish waiver under Utah law. 
We conclude that Phoenix properly stated the 
requirements for waiver: 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing 
right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its 
existence, and an intention to relinquish it. 
We further clarify that the intent to relinquish a right 
must be distinct. Under this legal standard, a fact 
finder need only determine whether the totality of the 
circumstances "warrants the inference of 
relinquishment." Such a flexible approach is 
particularly important because waiver is a term which 
has various meanings depending on the facts and the 
context in which it is used. 92 C.J.S. 
Soter's at 942 (internal citations omitted.). 
This Court has further addressed the burden of persuasion to establish the 
defense of waiver. In Red Cliffs Corner v. J.J. Hunan, 2009 UT App 240 [^15 
(Utah App., 2009), citing Kenny v. Rich, 2008 UT App 209, |18, 186 P.3d 989 
this Court found: 
Whether a party has effectuated a waiver is a mixed 
question of law and fact. [Wjhether the trial court 
employed the proper standard of waiver presents a 
legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but 
the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are 
factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual 
determinations. Thus, we grant broadened discretion 
to the trial court's findings when reviewing 
questions of waiver, (Emphasis added.) 
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The Red Cliffs Corner case continued at f 33: 
Hunan argues that the trial court erred when it 
concluded that Hunan waived its breach of lease claim 
against RCC. "[A] waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right." IHC Health Servs., 
Inc. v. D & K Mgmt. Inc.. 2008 UT 73,116, 196 P.3d 
588. The elements of waiver consist of: "(1) an 
existing right, (2) knowledge of its existence, and (3) 
an intent to relinquish the right." Id. Hunan does not 
argue the first two elements of waiver. 
The trial court was warranted in finding, by totality of the testimony and the 
evidence, that Watkins demonstrated he waived his rights under the Contracts. 
The trial court specifically held: "Plaintiff [Watkins], by his actions, unequivocally 
demonstrated his intent to relinquish his rights to purchase the subject vehicles 
from defendant [HDF]". (Findings of Fact f41.) The trial court concluded at 
Conclusions of Law f 10: 
Plaintiffs acceptance of the return of his deposit and 
his subsequent inaction clearly demonstrate plaintiffs 
voluntary relinquishment of his known rights 
particularly with plaintiffs experience in the auto 
dealership industry and both parties' uncertainty as to 
when and if defendant would receive the contracted 
vehicles." 
In this case, the elements of waiver were established by the undisputed 
evidence. The trial court found: 
Though plaintiff, as noted above is an experienced 
automobile dealer and as such would be very familiar 
with industry practices, he negotiated the return of his 
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deposit without objection or reservation of any type. 
Based upon plaintiffs experience, in the auto 
dealership industry, plaintiffs claim that he deposited 
the check because he did not know what to do with the 
check lacks credibility. Plaintiff made no attempt 
whatsoever to communicate any concerns he had with 
the letter and the check, nor made any attempts within 
a reasonable time of receiving the letter and check to 
assert or enforce his contract rights. 
Plaintiff, by his acceptance of his deposit without 
reservation, objection, or condition, unequivocally 
demonstrated his abandonment of the Contracts. 
Plaintiffs demand that the Contracts be honored by 
defendant over two (2) years after plaintiff accepted a 
return of his deposit is unreasonable. The Court finds 
that defendant returned plaintiffs check in good faith 
and based upon the reasonable belief they would not be 
allotted any Ford GT40?s. 
Plaintiff, by his actions, unequivocally demonstrated 
his intent to relinquish his rights to purchase the 
subject vehicles from defendant. 
(Findings of Fact ffl[28, 40, 41, 42.) 
Again, Watkins testified at trial: 
Q. Did you call Henry Day and say, "Keep my check? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you call to object to them returning it to them -
to you? 
A. No. 
(Trial Tr. 80:5-9.) 
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Undisputedly, Watkins, as an experienced automobile dealer, knew his 
rights under the Contracts, and clearly demonstrated his intention to relinquish 
those rights when he negotiated the $2,000.00 check. 
Waiver may be implied from conduct or silence. Soter's at 940. In this 
case, Watkins' conduct, cashing the check, and his silence, not contacting Henry 
Day Ford until June 2005, over two years after receiving the check, constitutes a 
waiver of the Contracts. 
In Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 73 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme 
Court held: 
[M]ere silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty 
or obligation to speak. It is generally accepted that a 
duty to speak will not be found where the contracting 
parties' deal at arm's length and where the underlying 
facts are reasonably within the knowledge of both 
parties. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff is 
obliged to take reasonable steps to inform himself and 
to protect his own interest. 
In the case of In the Matter of the Estate of Flake v. Flake, 71 P.2d 589 
(Utah 2003) the Court held: 
Waiver of a contractual right occurs when a party to a 
contract intentionally acts in a manner inconsistent 
with its contractual rights, and, as a result, prejudice 
accrues to the opposing party or parties to the contract. 
Watkins was aware of his rights under the contract, after HDF's negative 
representation regarding allocation, that there remained a possibility that HDF 
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would receive an allocation of the subject cars if the dealership received a sales 
award. HDF's desire to cancel the Contracts based on its own belief that it would 
not receive an allocation did nothing to change Watkinsf contingent contractual 
rights. Thus, the parties' belief regarding the probability that HDF would receive 
an allocation of the subject cars is irrelevant. At the time Watkins received the 
refund check, he had a contingent right to purchase the subject cars if later 
allocated to HDF. Watkins, however, relinquished his contractual rights when he 
negotiated the return of deposit check. With regard to the deposit, Watkins was 
asked: 
Q. Well that deposit was important, was it not sir? 
A. Yes. 
(Trial Tr. 79:21-25). 
Watkins did nothing to protect his own interest. Watkins' silence by not 
contacting HDF upon receipt of the $2,000.00 check or at any other time prior to 
June 2005 also demonstrated Watkins' waiver of his rights under the Contracts. 
Watkins knew his rights under the Contracts. Watkins demonstrated, by his 
conduct of cashing the check without reservation or comment, that he intended to 
waive his rights under the Contracts, and Watkins' later demand on HDF that it 
honor the Contracts prejudiced HDF. The evidence and the trial court's findings 
demonstrate that Watkins waived his rights under Contracts. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED 
IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS A 
LATENT AMBIGUITY IN THE 
CONTRACTS. 
The Contracts at issue in this case are clear and unambiguous, and could not 
be more so. It was undisputed at trial that the Contracts are standard forms, with 
which both parties were exceedingly familiar. The law applicable where a contract 
is clear and intended to be a final expression of the parties' bargain is clear: 
In interpreting a contract, we look to the writing itself 
to ascertain the parties' intentions, and we consider 
each contract provision in relation to all of the others, 
with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring 
none. 
If the language within the four corners of the contract 
is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined 
from the plain meaning of the contractual language, 
and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of 
law.... 
An ambiguity exists in a contract term or provision if it 
is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation 
because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, 
or other facial deficiencies. 
WebBank v. American General Annuity Service Corp.. 2002 UT 88,1Hf 18-20, 54 
P.3d 1139, citing Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, |19, 48 P.3d 918. 
In this case, we do not confront unclear language or omitted language, 
but rather Watkins' claim to an alternate "plausible" interpretation. Cases that 
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have required testing for the presence of contract ambiguity have, not surprisingly, 
avoided an etymologically-based test of plausibility. Rather, courts have been 
content to permit plausibility to speak for itself. For example, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that the proffered alternate interpretation "must be plausible and 
reasonable in light of the language used," (First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, 
Inc.. 966 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah 1998)), and that to merit consideration as an 
interpretation that creates an ambiguity, the alternative rendition "must be based 
upon the usual and natural meaning of the language used and may not be the result 
of a forced or strained construction." Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 817 P.2d 341, 367 (Utah Ct.App.1991). This Court has left some discretion to 
courts in determining whether ambiguity exists, at a minimum one universal 
standard applies to this determination: words and phrases do not qualify as 
ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow them with a different 
interpretation according to his or her own interests. Alf v. State Farm Fire and 
Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah, 1993). 
When determining whether a contract provision is ambiguous, the parties 
may look to evidence beyond the language of the contract. But "[t]he only 
evidence relevant to that inquiry is evidence of the facts known to the parties at the 
time they entered the [agreement]." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, If 19, 
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48 P.3d 918 (second alteration in original) (quoting Yeargin, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n. 2001 UT 11,1(39, 20 P.3d 287). 
A. There is No Facial Ambiguity in the Contracts. 
The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court that "there exists no facial 
ambiguity in either of the contracts at issue here". (Appellate Court Opinion f 14.) 
Additionally, HDF submits that the Contracts executed by the parties are 
undisputedly clear and unambiguous and were intended to be a final and complete 
expression of the parties' bargain. The Contracts specifically provided that 
Watkins requested to purchase UGT 40s" (Findings of Facts fflf 2, 3 and 4) and 
HDF agreed to sell to Watkins two (2) Ford GT 40's. (Findings of Fact flO) 
This Court has recently addressed the principles to be used by trial courts in 
interpreting a written contract, and it has consistently held that a "court first looks 
to the contract's four corners to determine the parties' intentions"3 In South Ridge 
Homeowners' Ass'n v. Brown. 226 P.3d 758, 2010 UT App 23 (Utah App., 2010) 
the Court of Appeals held: 
3
 See: IHC Health Servs. v. D & K Mgmt.. 2008 UT 73,144,196 P.3d 588; Cafe Rio, 
Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford- Overton. LLC. 2009 UT 27,125, 207 P.3d 1235; Red Cliffs 
Corner v. J.J. Hunan. 2009 UT App 240 (Utah App. 9/3/2009), 2009 UT App 240 
(Utah App., 2009); Encon Utah. LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer. LLC. 2009 UT 7,210 
P.3d 263 (Utah, 2009); Innerlight. Inc. v. Matrix Group. LLC. 2009 UT 31 (Utah 
6/5/2009), 2009 UT 31 (Utah, 2009); Free Motion Fitness. Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank 
West. 208 P.3d 209 UT App 120 (Utah App., 2009). 
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Accordingly, our interpretation of the relevant 
provisions is limited to the four corners of the CC&Rs, 
and we of course interpret the relevant language in 
light of the overall meaning and intent of the CC&Rs. 
See Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins. 2009 UT 52, | 19, 
215 P.3d 933 ("When we interpret a contract, . . . we 
determine the intent of the contracting parties by first 
look[ing] to the writing alone. If the writing is 
unambiguous, we determine the intent of the parties 
exclusively from the plain meaning of the contractual 
language.") (alteration in original) (citation footnotes 
and internal quotation marks omitted); Peterson & 
Simpson v. IHC Health Servs.. Inc., 2009 UT 54, f 13, 
217 P.3d 716 ("As with any contract, we determine 
what the parties have agreed upon by looking first to 
the plain language within the four corners of the 
document. When interpreting the plain language, fwe 
look for a reading that harmonizes the provisions and 
avoids rendering any provision meaningless.' If we 
find the language unambiguous, we interpret the 
contract as a matter of law.") (citations omitted). See 
also Swenson v. Erickson. 2000 UT 16, If 11, 998 P.2d 
807("Restrictive covenants that run with the land and 
encumber subdivision lots form a contract between 
subdivision property owners as a whole and individual 
lot owners; therefore, interpretation of the covenants is 
governed by the same rules of construction as those 
used to interpret contracts."). "In interpreting contracts, 
fthe ordinary and usual meaning of the words used is 
given effect,'" which "ordinary meaning . . . is often 
best determined through standard, non-legal 
dictionaries." Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n. 899 P.2d 779,782 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
(citation omitted). 
In this case, as in South Ridge, the relevant provisions of the Contracts are 
not ambiguous. The fact that the parties may have different views about the 
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meaning of the key terms does not render the terms ambiguous. A contract term is 
not ambiguous simply because one party ascribes a different meaning to it to suit 
his or her own interests. (See, Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 845 P.2d 
1187, 1192 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
The Contracts at issue in this case are undisputedly clear. Watkins 
negotiated and signed two (2) Contracts, which he acknowledged to be correct, to 
purchase two (2) Ford GT 40's from HDF. The Court of Appeals, however, 
proposes that the Contracts do not state what they state and proposes that since 
Ford changed the designation of the Ford GT40 to the Ford GT that Watkins 
should have been allowed to purchase a Ford GT from HDF. This conclusion is 
in error for several reasons. 
First, Watkins went to HDF specifically to purchase one or more Ford GT 
40s. Watkins acknowledged that Ford built GT 40s (Trial Tr. 38:26, 39:1-2) and 
that Ford could build a Ford GT 40 in the future (Trial Tr. 74:22-24). The Trial 
Court found: 
It was undisputed that Plaintiff specifically requested 
that the Defendant sell him Ford GT 40 automobiles 
and Plaintiffs request was specifically referenced in 
the Contracts which were executed by the Plaintiff and 
Defendant. 
(Findings of Fact f 11; Trial Tr.70:5-13.) 
32 
Second, if Watkins would have intended to by, any other vehicle, he could 
have so requested that in the Contracts. Watkins testified at trial: 
Q. And was there ever a period, sir, you called and 
said, "I don't want to buy a Ford GT40. I want to buy 
a Ford GT." The contract should be changed"? 
A. No. 
(Findings of Fact f22; Trial Transcript at 71:17-20.) 
It is also undisputed that HDF has never had a Ford GT40. 
Given the sophisticated business parties involved in these Contracts, who 
are both familiar with the automobile dealing business, the Contracts should be 
interpreted strictly on the plain language of the contract. ASC Utah. Inc. v. Wolf 
Mountain Resorts. L.C.. 2010 UT 65, 245 P.3d 184, 193 ("Sophisticated business 
parties are charged with knowledge of the terms of the contracts that they enter 
into.). In fact, the Appellate Court held that the Contracts were not facially 
ambiguous. (Appellate Opinion ^fl4.) Thus, the circumstances which the 
Appellate Court claims gave rise to the latent ambiguity are not relevant to the 
Contracts. Because Watkins and HDF are both sophisticated business parties, they 
had the bargaining power and sophistication to include the true object of their 
agreement within the language of the Contracts. If the parties intended the object 
of the Contracts to be "the street-legal car produced in the likeness of the GT40 
exhibited in 2002 at the Detroit Auto Show," then they could, and should, have 
stated that in the writing. 
The Appellate Court erred in finding a latent ambiguity in the Contracts 
because "it is this court's duty to enforce the intentions of the parties as expressed 
in the plain language [of a contract.]" Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 
812 (Utah 2000). Additionally, the court is not charged with making "a better 
contract for the parties than they have made for themselves." Bakowski v. 
Mountain States Steel Inc.. 2002 UT 62, 52 P.3d 1179,1185 (Wherein the court 
refused to disregard a contract's plain language in order to interpret an ambiguity 
into a contract which would create a "better contract than the parties had made for 
themselves" just to achieve an "equitable" result.); see also E. & W. Ins Co of New 
Haven. Conn v. Fidel 49 F.2d 35, 38 (10th Cir. 1931) (A strained construction will 
not be resorted to in order to establish an ambiguity which does not exist.). 
Whether a contractual term or provision is ambiguous is a question of law. 
See Daines v. Vincent. 2008 UT 51, | 25, 190 P.3d 1269. Once the court 
determines that the term or provision of a contract is facially ambiguous, it may 
determine the parties' intent through examination of parol evidence, the 
determination of which presents a question of fact. The trial court concluded from 
the evidence and testimony presented that the language in the Contracts was clear 
and unambiguous. The Utah Supreme Court addressed this subject in Cafe Rio, 
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Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC. 2009 UT 6, 622 Utah Adv. Rep. 31. In Cafe 
Rio, the Supreme Court set forth the guiding principles for contract interpretation, 
including how to determine if ambiguity exists in a contract and when parol 
evidence of intent may be considered. The court in Cafe Rio at f25 held: 
Under well-accepted rules of contract interpretation, 
we look to the language of the contract to determine its 
meaning and the intent of the contracting parties. We 
also consider each contract pro vision...in relation to all 
of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all 
and ignoring none. Where the language within the four 
corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' 
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of 
the contractual language, and the contract may be 
interpreted as a matter of law. Only if the language of 
the contract is ambiguous will we consider extrinsic 
evidence of the parties' intent. We have explained that 
ambiguity exists in a contract term or provision if it is 
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation 
because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, 
or other facial deficiencies. 
In the present case, the first step must be to determine if the Contracts are 
ambiguous, i.e., whether the contract language is "susceptible to contrary, tenable 
interpretations." The Court of Appeals considered one (1) trial exhibit, which 
exhibit was not testified to or about at trial, in determining that the Contracts were 
ambiguous. Although many Utah cases have stated that the parties' intent is 
paramount, admission of parol evidence to determine intent is allowed only if there 
is a finding of facial ambiguity. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals 
determined that there was no facial ambiguity in the Contracts. The term"GT 40" 
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in the Contracts defines precisely what Watkins desired to purchase from HDF. 
The Contracts represented what Watkins, an experienced automobile dealer, 
requested. Even if the name of the vehicle changed, as alleged by the Watkins, he 
did not request a modification of the Contracts to reflect a different model, though 
Watkins knew he had the right to make such a request. 
The Trial Court Concluded: 
The Court is required to interpret the parties' contracts 
based upon the plain meaning contained in the 
Contracts. 
The Contracts provided that defendant was to sell to 
plaintiff a "Ford GT40". 
Defendant has not been allocated a Ford GT 40 and, as 
such, defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts 
and, as such, plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed. 
(Conclusions of Law ffl[3, 4, 5.) 
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the Contracts do not state 
what they state and since Ford changed the designation of the Ford GT 40 to the 
Ford GT that Watkins should have been allowed to purchase a Ford GT from 
HDF. The trial court held, for a number of reasons, including Watkins's own 
testimony, that he specifically requested that HDF sell him Ford GT 40 
automobiles and Watkins' request was specifically referenced in the Contracts. 
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(Findings of Fact f l l ; Trial Tr.70:5-13.) If Watkins would have intended to by 
any other vehicle, he could have so requested that in the Contracts. 
Only if the language of a contract is ambiguous will extrinsic evidence of 
the parties' intent be allowed. Extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to create 
an ambiguity in the contract when the term "GT 40" is clear and unambiguous. 
Accordingly, no facial ambiguity exists and the trial court was correct in 
determining that the Contracts were clear and unambiguous as to the term of UGT 
40" and the parties' intent. 
The testimony at trial was a GT 40 and a GT are not the same. The vehicle 
model that Watkins desired to buy, when it later became available to the public, 
was the vehicle that Ford had recently introduced at the Detroit Auto Show as the 
GT 40. The problem with this statement is two fold. First, as noted above, though 
he alleged a name change as early as 2003, Watkins never asked to modify the 
Contracts to reflect this 'new name'. Second, Watkins had already accepted his 
deposit back without objection. 
Third, if the model GT 40 was changed to the GT, that did not prevent Ford 
from introducing a Ford GT 40 in the future, as it has done with other Ford 
models. For example, Ford has designated the Ford Mustang as a "Mustang", 
"Mustang GT", "Shelby", and/or "500". (Trial Tr. 74:20-24; Trial Tr. 138:1-23.) 
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The Contracts reference on three (3) separate occasions within the Contract 
that Watkins was obligated to purchase, and HDF was obligated to sell to Watkins, 
Ford GT 40s and no other vehicle. 
B. The Contracts Executed by the Parties were Integrated 
Contracts. 
The integration clause demonstrates that the Contracts were a final 
expression of the parties' intent. In Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren. 2008 UT 
20, 182 P.3d 326,, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated that "[w]hether a contract is 
integrated is a question of fact reviewed for clear error." Notwithstanding that 
standard of review, the Tangren court noted that extrinsic evidence would be 
allowed on the issue of integration, despite "a clear integration clause, where the 
contract is alleged to be a forgery, a joke, a sham, lacking in consideration, or 
where a contract is voidable for fraud, duress, mistake, or illegality." 
The Tangren court further disavowed prior cases that may have allowed extrinsic 
evidence outside the enumerated types of allegations, holding that "we will not 
allow extrinsic evidence of a separate agreement to be considered on the question 
of integration in the face of a clear integration clause." 
The Contracts contain an integration clause: 
Purchaser [Watkins] agrees that this contract includes 
all of the terms, conditions and warranties on both the 
face and reverse side hereof, that this agreement 
cancels and supersedes any prior agreement and as of 
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the date hereof comprises the complete and exclusive 
statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the 
subject matter covered hereby. 
HDF and Watkins explicitly agree that the Contracts contain the entire 
understanding between the parties with respect to its subject-matter. Integration 
clauses, such as this one, are routinely incorporated in agreements in order to 
signal to the courts that the parties agree that the contract is to be considered 
completely integrated. A completely integrated agreement must be interpreted on 
its face, and thus the purpose and effect of including a merger is to preclude the 
subsequent introduction of evidence of preliminary negotiations or of side 
agreements in a proceeding in which a court interprets the document. Ford v. Am. 
Express Fin. Advisors, Inc.2004 UT 70, f 28, 98 P.3d 15 (quoting Sec. Watch. 
Inc. v. Sentinel Sys.. Inc.. 176 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir.1999)). 
In the present case, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed because the 
Contracts contain a clear integration clause. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT 
DETERMINED THAT HDF BREACHED THE 
CONTRACTS. 
The Contracts specifically provided that Watkins contracted to purchase 
two (2) Ford GT40's. The Contracts in this case represented what Watkins, an 
experienced automobile dealer, requested. Even if the name of the vehicle 
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changed, Watkins did not request a modification of the Contracts to reflect a 
different model, though Watkins knew he had the right to make, and that he had in 
the past made, such a request. 
The trial court concluded: 
The Court is required to interpret the parties' contracts 
based upon the plain meaning contained in the 
Contracts. 
The Contracts provided that defendant was to sell to 
plaintiff a "Ford GT40". 
Defendant has not been allocated a Ford GT 40 and, as 
such, defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts 
and, as such, plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed. 
(Conclusions of Law ^ 3 , 4, 5.) 
In this case, the Contracts are undisputedly clear. Watkins asked to 
purchase two (2) GT40's and, pursuant to Watkins' request, two (2) Contracts 
were prepared, read, and signed by Watkins. The Contracts represented the parties' 
bargain in every respect. Watkins testified at trial: 
Q. And was there ever a period, sir, you called and 
said, "I don't want to buy a Ford GT40. I want to buy 
a Ford GT." The contract should be changed"? 
A. No. 
(Trial Tr. 71:17-20.) 
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It is again important to note that Watkins acknowledged that Ford had built 
a model GT40. (Trial Tr. 38:25, 39:1-2.) Watkins also acknowledged that Ford 
could build a Ford GT40 in the future. (Trial Tr. 74:22-24.) 
The Contracts at issue were undisputedly intended by the parties to be the 
final expression of their agreement. The Contracts each provided: 
Purchaser [Watkins] agrees that this contract includes 
all of the terms, conditions and warranties on both the 
face and reverse side hereof, that this agreement 
cancels and supersedes any prior agreement and as of 
the date hereof comprises the complete and exclusive 
statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the 
subject matter covered hereby. 
The parties' failure to include the referenced terms, however, does not allow the 
specific terms of the Contracts to be explained. 
A. Reasonable Time to Perform. 
In an attempt to give effect to the intent of the parties, the settled rule is that 
if a contract fails to specify a time of performance the law implies that it shall be 
done within a reasonable time under the circumstances, and in case of controversy 
that is something for the trial court to determine. Watson v. Hatch., 728 P.2d 989, 
990 (Utah 1986) (citing Bradford v. Alvev & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Utah 
1980)); Forsgren v. Sollie. 659 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Utah 1983) (implying a 
reasonable time constraint on the performance of a condition subsequent in a real 
estate transfer). 
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The Contracts at issue in this case fail to specify a time within which HDF 
would deliver the automobiles to Watkins. Accordingly, the trial court found: 
It was not until February 2004, over two years after 
plaintiff accepted the return of his deposit, that 
defendant learned that it would be allocated a Ford GT 
based upon defendant being awarded the Share of the 
Nation Award for the 2003 sales year. 
(Findings of Fact 129.) 
Plaintiffs demand that the Contracts be honored by 
defendant over two years after plaintiff accepted a 
return of his deposit is unreasonable. The Court find 
that defendant returned plaintiffs check in good faith 
and based upon its reasonable belief they would not be 
allotted any Ford GT40's. 
(Finding of Fact 141.) 
Applying the aforementioned rules of contract construction to the Contracts 
in this case, HDF argues that it was implied in the contract that Watkins and HDF 
expected the Contracts to be completed within a few months. We can glean 
Watkins1 intent from his complaint and industry standards. At the time of 
Watkins' Complaint, Watkins acknowledged that he did not "expect to receive 
delivery of the Ford GT40s for many months". (Trial Tr. 81:1-4; Watkins' 
Complaint 120.) Neither Contracts specified a delivery date. (Appendix 3.) 
At the end of 2002, after HDF had held Watkins' deposit for nearly ten (10) 
months and after HDF had received confirmation from Ford that it would not 
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receive a Ford GT40 unless it won a major Ford award (which HDF had not done 
in 40+ years). On December 31, 2002, HDF prepared and mailed to Watkins a 
letter in which it stated: "[ejnclosed please find a check for the refund of deposit 
on your vehicle order. We regret to inform you that our allocation is not going to 
allow us to receive this vehicle." Watkins did not contact HDF after receiving a 
return of his deposit. (Trial Tr. 80:7-9.) Based on Watkins belief and intention 
that the Contracts would be completed within a few months, he acknowledged the 
return of his $2,000.00 and deposited the check into his bank account. (Trial Tr. 
52:24-25.) Under the circumstances of this case the return of the deposits, which 
was not objected to by Watkins, was made in reasonable time and at that time the 
contracts terminated. Since the Contracts are absent any indication that Watkins 
and HDF intended to hold the option open indefinitely, HDF submits that the 
Contracts contemplate that HDF was free abandon the Contracts when it 
understood it would not be receiving any GT 40s within a reasonable time. 
B. Meeting of the Minds. 
It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an 
agreement is essential to the formation of a contract." Richard Barton Enters, v. 
Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996). Thus, a binding contract exists where it can 
be shown that the parties had a meeting of the minds as to the "integral features of 
[the] agreement" and that the terms are sufficiently definite as to be capable of 
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being enforced. Prince. Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young. 2004 UT 26 94 P.3d 
179 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case the only meeting of the 
parties' minds was Watkins agreeing to purchase, and HDF agreeing to sell, GT 
40's. 
Watkins and HDF were free to leave open terms in the contract, and the 
conduct by both parties recognizing the existence of the Contracts is sufficient to 
establish a contract for sale. 
POINT V 
WATKINS FAILED TO MITIGATE ANY 
DAMAGES. 
Finally, the Appellate Court reviewed the trial court's conclusion that 
Watkins' failure to mitigate any damages, which the appellate court can only 
overturn if the trial court's findings of fact are "clearly erroneous." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 
970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998). 
The Trial Court found: 
In the late summer of 2005, defendant offered to sell to 
plaintiff for MSRP the Ford GT which had been 
allocated to defendant. 
Plaintiff refused defendant's offer to purchase a Ford 
GT. Plaintiffs refusal to purchase the Ford GT 
constitutes a failure of Plaintiff to mitigate his 
damages. 
(Findings ofFactffl[38, 39.) 
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At trial, the Watkins testified: 
Q. Were you offered a Ford GT from Henry S. Day? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was that, sir? 
A. I don't know. Sometime after this. 
Q. Was it in 2005? 
A. It could have been. I was offered it through my 
lawyers. And I don't remember the date. 
Q. Okay. Was it shortly after you went into the 
dealership, sir? 
A. I don't think it was shortly after, no. 
Q. Within a month or two months? 
A. I don't know when. 
Q. What was your answer to the offer to sell you a 
Ford GT, sir? 
A. I declined it. 
Q. And were they offering to sell it to you for MSRP? 
A. Yes. 
(Trial Tr. 107:1-19.) 
As a general rule where a party might have avoided a particular item of 
damage by reasonable effort, without undue risk, expense, or humiliation, he may 
not recover for that item if he fails to make such an effort. (Restatement.2d §350.) 
The Restatement continues that "if a party fails to avoid his avoidable damages, 
he/she simply loses his ability to recover them". (Restatement. 2d §350, Comment 
b.) 
In Utah, damages awarded for breach of contract should place the non 
breaching party in as good a position as if the contract had been performed. 
However, the non breaching party has an active duty to mitigate his damages, and 
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he may not, either by action or inaction, aggravate the injury occasioned by the 
breach. Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, P31, 990 P.2d 933. In order to satisfy 
the duty to mitigate damages, a non breaching party must make "reasonable efforts 
and expenditures." Madsen v. Murrev & Sons Co.. 743 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Utah 
1987) (quotations and citations omitted); see Angelos v In. First Interstate Bank of 
Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983) (stating that mitigation of damages requires 
non breaching party to avoid damages by "reasonable means"). 
In this case, Watkins was offered the vehicle that he indicated he wanted to 
purchase for MSRP. Watkins declined to purchase the vehicle and thereby, 
effectively, failed to mitigate his damages. The finding by the Trial Court is 
supported by the undisputed facts and Watkins's appeal should be summarily 
dismissed. Thus, the Appellate Court erred when it overturned the trial court's 
factual findings as to Watkins' failure to mitigate. 
POINT VI 
HENRY DAY FORD IS ENTITLED TO 
RECOVER ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS. 
In Utah, attorney's fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by 
contract. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). The 
Contracts provided: 
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In the event it becomes necessary for Seller to enforce 
any of the terms, conditions or warranties in this 
agreement, Purchaser agrees to pay reasonable 
attorney's fees, court costs, and collection fees. 
(Trial Exhibits 1-4; Appendices 1-2.) 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-5-826 provides: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either 
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing 
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of 
the promissory note, written contract, or other writing 
allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees. 
Pursuant to the Contracts, HDF was entitled to an award of its attorney's 
fees and costs. 
Clearly, the award of attorney's fees and costs by the trial court is supported 
by the Contracts and HDF should be awarded its attorney's fees and costs incurred 
on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon testimony and evidence presented at trial, the Trial Court 
concluded: 
The Contracts are clear and unambiguous and were 
intended to be the final and complete expression of the 
parties' bargains. 
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The Contracts between the parties are integrated 
agreements. 
The Court finds the parties abandoned the Contracts. 
Defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts and, as 
such, plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed. 
Defendant is awarded its reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs in an amount to be proven by Affidavit. 
(Conclusions of Law ^[1, 2, 9, 11, 12; Appendix 3.) 
The Trial Court's decisions were each supported by the evidence and the 
law. Based upon the foregoing, Henry Day Ford requests this Court affirm the 
trial court's dismissal of Watkins' Complaint and award of attorney's fees and 
costs to Henry Day Ford. Henry Day Ford further requests that Henry Day Ford 
be awarded its attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of April, 2011. 
ROBERT WrHUGHES 
Attorney for Henry Day Ford 
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DAVIS, Presiding Judge: 
Hi Plaintiff Tom Watkins appeals the judgment of the trial 
court resolving his contractual dispute with Defendant Henry Day 
Ford (Henry Day). Watkins argues that the trial court erred in 
several respects in its decision. We reverse and remand for 
further proceedings. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 At the North American Auto Show in January 2002, Ford Motor 
Company (Ford) unveiled a GT4 0 concept car, which was designed to 
resemble the legendary race car of the same name that had 
achieved great success in the 1960s. When the concept car 
received an extremely positive reception at the auto show, Ford 
announced that it would commence production of a street-legal 
version of the car. When Watkins, the owner of a non-Ford auto 
dealership, became aware of this, he tried to find a Ford 
dealership that would take his order for one of the newly-
announced cars. After some searching, Watkins met with a 
representative of Henry Day in early March 2002, who ultimately 
told Watkins that if Henry Day was allocated such cars, it would 
be willing to sell two of them to Watkins. 
1(3 Watkins and Henry Day then entered into two contracts 
finalizing their agreement. One contract provided for the sale 
of the first GT4 0 Henry Day received and the other provided for 
the sale of the second GT4 0 received. At this time, Watkins gave 
Henry Day a check for $2000, which represented a $1000 down 
payment on each of the anticipated cars. The contracts were 
amended the following day to show that the agreed-upon purchase 
price for the cars was the manufacturer's suggested retail price 
(MSRP). Because the parties did not know when the cars would be 
produced, there was no model year or delivery date specified in 
the contracts. And because it was uncertain whether Henry Day 
would even receive one of the cars, the parties understood that 
the receipt of the cars was a condition precedent to the 
obligations to buy and sell under the contracts, although this 
understanding was not incorporated into the language of the 
contracts. 
f4 Several months later, in December 2 0 02, Henry Day's general 
manager called a Ford representative to determine whether Henry 
Day would be allocated any of the GT40s. Ford's response was 
that the only way Henry Day would be allocated any GT40s was by 
winning certain company awards, which awards Henry Day had never 
before won in its forty-year history. Thus, Henry Day, 
considering it quite unlikely that it would receive any GT40s, 
decided to return Watkins's deposit to him. In a letter dated 
December 31, 2002, Henry Day told Watkins, "We regret to inform 
you that our allocation is not going to allow us to receive this 
vehicle," and included a $2000 check for the refund of Watkins's 
deposit. Watkins negotiated the check without objection or any 
further discussion of the matter with Henry Day representatives. 
f5 At some point thereafter, it became clear that Ford would be 
calling the newly-announced car simply the GT and not the GT40. 
Several new GTs were manufactured in time for and used during 
Ford's centennial celebration in June 2003. But the first of the 
new cars sold to the public was a 2005 model, sold in August 2003 
and delivered in late 2004. 
f6 Notwithstanding Henry Day's prior award history, the 
dealership did receive awards for the years 2003 and 2004 that 
ultimately resulted in Henry Day receiving three Ford GTs. The 
first car was allocated in December 2004 and the second was 
allocated in May 2005, the cars having MSRPs of $156,595 and 
$156,945, respectively. Shortly after the second allocation, one 
of Watkins's employees told Watkins that she had heard that Henry 
Day had received two Ford GTs. Watkins immediately went to the 
dealership, checkbook in hand, and insisted that Henry Day abide 
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by the parties' contracts and sell him the two Ford GTs for MSRP. 
Henry Day's representative refused, insisting that the contracts 
were no longer in force, and offered to instead sell Watkins one 
of the cars for $250,000. Watkins refused the offer. 
fl7 Watkins filed suit against Henry Day in the beginning of 
July 2005 for breach of contract. Toward the end of the summer 
of 2005, Henry Day eventually offered to sell Watkins a Ford GT 
for MSRP. Watkins, who argues that the market value of the cars 
had "dropped significantly" by this time, refused Henry Day's 
offer. 
1(8 The case ultimately proceeded to a bench trial. The trial 
court ruled in Henry Day's favor, determining that (1) there was 
no breach of contract because the contracts unambiguously 
provided for the sale of GT4 0s and Henry Day never received any 
such cars, (2) Watkins had abandoned the contracts and waived his 
rights thereunder when he negotiated the $2000 check refunding 
his deposit, and (3) Watkins had failed to mitigate his damages 
when he refused Henry Day's eventual offer to sell one of the 
Ford GTs for MSRP. And due to Henry Day's prevailing on the 
issues, the trial court awarded Henry Day its reasonable attorney 
fees and costs in accordance with the terms of the contracts. 
Watkins now appeals the trial court's determinations. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
f9 Watkins first argues that the trial court erred in 
determining that the contracts between the parties were not 
ambiguous and in interpreting those unambiguous terms of the 
contracts. These are both questions of law that we review for 
correctness. See Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 
P.2d 341, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("The interpretation of a 
contract normally presents a question of law. . . . The question 
of whether a contract provision is ambiguous, i.e., susceptible 
to two or more reasonable interpretations, is also a question of 
law."). 
if 10 Watkins next argues that the trial court erred when it 
determined that by negotiating the $2000 check from Henry Day, he 
abandoned the contracts and waived his rights thereunder. "Where 
there is dispute as to whether [abandonment] has occurred, it is 
usually a question of fact, to be determined from the 
circumstances of the particular case . . . ." Timpanogos 
Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481, 484 (Utah 1975) 
(footnote omitted). Thus, "we do not reverse unless we are 
persuaded that the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings." Id. Likewise, "the actions or events allegedly 
supporting waiver are factual in nature and should be reviewed as 
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factual determinations, to which we give a district court 
deference." Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, 1 16, 982 P.2d 
572. 
H11 Finally, Watkins argues that the trial court erred in 
determining that he failed to mitigate any damages. " [W]e review 
a trial court's conclusions as to the legal effect of a given set 
of found facts for correctness." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 
1244 (Utah 1998). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Ambiguity 
Hl2 The trial court determined that the contracts at issue here 
are "clear and unambiguous and were intended to be a final and 
complete expression of the parties' bargain."1 The trial court 
therefore determined that because each contract was facially 
unambiguous, providing specifically for the sale of a Ford GT40, 
this was the exact name of the car that was to be provided under 
the contracts and that because Henry Day never received any 
vehicles bearing that exact name, it did not breach the 
contracts. 
1Jl3 The Utah Supreme Court has established "a two-part standard 
for determining facial ambiguity." Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 
51, f 26, 190 P.3d 1269. First, the trial court must determine 
whether the contract is facially ambiguous. See id. 
When determining whether a contract is 
ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be 
xIt seems that the trial court relied in part on the 
integrated nature of the contracts in making its determination. 
Similarly, Henry Day relies on the integration clause of the 
contracts to argue that extrinsic evidence may not be considered 
in the ambiguity determination. Although we agree with the trial 
court and Henry Day that the contracts are integrated, this 
conclusion does not have the result that Henry Day suggests. It 
is true that "in the face of a clear integration clause, 
extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement is not admissible 
on the question of integration." Tangren Family Trust v. 
Tangren, 2008 UT 20, f 17, 182 P.3d 326 (emphasis added). But 
the question of integration is merely the first step in the 
analysis, after which we proceed to the question of whether there 
is an ambiguity in the contracts, see id. f 18, which exercise, 
as we discuss in our analysis above, allows resort to some 
extrinsic evidence. 
considered. Otherwise, the determination of 
ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it 
is based solely on the extrinsic evidence of 
the judge's own linguistic education and 
experience. Although the terms of an 
instrument may seem clear to a particular 
reader--including a judge--this does not rule 
out the possibility that the parties chose 
the language of the agreement to express a 
different meaning. A judge should therefore 
consider any credible evidence offered to 
show the parties' intention. 
While there is Utah case law that 
espouses a stricter application of the rule 
and would restrict a determination of whether 
ambiguity exists to a judge's determination 
of the meaning of the terms of the writing 
itself, the better-reasoned approach is to 
consider the writing in light of the 
surrounding circumstances. Rational 
interpretation requires at least a 
preliminary consideration of all credible 
evidence offered to prove the intention of 
the parties . . . so that the court can place 
itself in the same situation in which the 
parties found themselves at the time of 
contracting. 
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 
1995) (omission in original) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). Second, after considering evidence of ambiguity, 
the trial court "must ensure that the interpretations contended 
for are reasonably supported by the language of the contract." 
Daines, 2008 UT 51, f 26 (internal quotation marks omitted). If 
they are, "then extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify the 
ambiguous terms"; otherwise, "the parties' intentions must be 
determined solely from the language of the contract." Ward, 907 
P.2d at 268. 
fll4 We agree with the trial court that there exists no facial 
ambiguity in either of the contracts at issue here. When we 
look, as we must, to the evidence presented regarding the facts 
known to the parties and the circumstances present at the time 
the parties were contracting, it is clear that the parties' use 
of the term GT40 is susceptible to only one interpretation and 
was intended to represent only one thing. Considering that Ford 
had just recently made the announcement regarding the production 
of a street-legal version of the GT40 and that this prompted 
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Watkins's search for a dealership that would sell him one,2 it is 
obvious that this is the type of car for which the parties were 
contracting. Indeed, the Henry Day representative who signed the 
contracts testified to this effect, stating unequivocally and 
repeatedly that he shared Watkins's understanding regarding the 
model of car being discussed: 
Q. Now the cars that were the subject 
of this contract were brand new product, were 
they not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you understood that the 
automobiles that were the subject of these 
contracts [were] the yet to be produced Ford 
GT concept car or the GT40 as it was called 
at that time, correct? 
A. Correct. 
The evidence of the circumstances surrounding the contract 
formation and the situation of the parties at the time of 
contract formation simply does not indicate any other 
understanding on the part of either party.3 And the 
2Henry Day objects to the various published articles 
submitted by Watkins to show that the announcement made regarding 
the GT4 0 was made just prior to the parties having entered into 
the contracts and to show that the name of that announced car was 
ultimately changed to the GT. Henry Day correctly states that 
nearly all of these articles are not part of the record below and 
that we therefore may not rely upon those articles on appeal, see 
In re L.M., 2001 UT App 314, f 16 n.3, 37 P.3d 1188 ("Our policy 
has long been, and continues to be, we will not consider new 
evidence on appeal." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
However, one of the articles was offered as an exhibit below and 
we rely on information gleaned from it. Although Henry Day 
asserts that this exhibit "was found to be hearsay and was not 
supported by any other credible evidence," this is a gross 
misrepresentation of what actually occurred. In fact, Henry Day 
stipulated to the admission of this exhibit at trial and in no 
way objected to it at any point in the proceedings. Simply 
because Henry Day successfully objected to one question asked of 
a witness that may have elicited some of the same information as 
contained in the exhibit, that does not support the assertion 
that this exhibit was found to be hearsay. 
3Henry Day adamantly argues that we may not consider any 
evidence of the parties' intent outside the four corners of the 
(continued...) 
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understanding that the use of the term GT4 0 referenced the newly-
announced street-legal version of the GT4 0 is certainly supported 
by the language of the contracts. When the parties chose the 
term GT4 0, it was unambiguous and meant just that--the parties 
were contracting for the sale of what was then known as the GT40. 
Thus, the use of the term GT4 0 does not render the contracts 
facially ambiguous just because the car model ultimately produced 
was named simply the GT. 
|^ 15 Although we have determined that in looking at the face of 
the contracts there is no ambiguity with regard to the term GT40, 
our inquiry does not necessarily end there: 
Under Utah law, if the initial review of the 
plain language of a contract, within its four 
corners, reveals no patently obvious 
ambiguities, the inquiry into whether an 
ambiguity exists in a contract does not 
always end there. Utah's rules of contract 
interpretation allow courts to consider any 
relevant evidence to determine whether a 
latent ambiguity exists in contract terms 
that otherwise appear to be unambiguous. 
Gillmor v. Macev, 2005 UT App 351, % 35, 121 P.3d 57. A latent 
ambiguity is " [a]n ambiguity that does not readily appear in the 
language of a document, but instead arises from a collateral 
matter when the document's terms are applied or executed." 
Black's Law Dictionary 93 (9th ed. 2009) . Thus, if a contract, 
"while on its face appearing to be certain, would open up an 
ambiguity when attempts were made to apply it to the subject-
matter, then such ambiguity could be resolved by evidence of what 
meaning the parties themselves intended to invest such terms." 
Bamberger Co. v. Certified Prods., Inc., 88 Utah 194, 48 P.2d 
489, 494 (1935) ; see also Fox Film Corp. v. Ocrden Theatre Co., 82 
Utah 279, 17 P.2d 294, 296 (1932) ("One well-recognized exception 
to the [parol evidence] rule is that extrinsic evidence, parol or 
otherwise, is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity in a 
writing. This does not mean that terms or conditions may be 
inserted into or taken out of the writing by direct oral 
assertions, but it does mean that the court may receive evidence 
of such surrounding facts as will enable it to look upon the 
transaction through the eyes of the parties thereto and thereby 
3(...continued) 
contracts. As we set forth above, this is contrary to the law, 
which requires us to first look at the circumstances surrounding 
contract formation in determining whether there is an ambiguity. 
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know what they understood or intended the ambiguous word or 
provisions to mean."). 
fl6 We determine that there is a latent ambiguity in the 
contracts at issue here, created by Ford's later decision to name 
the anticipated car the GT instead of the GT40.4 We thus look to 
the same evidence of surrounding circumstances as we did above to 
determine what car the parties intended to buy and sell. Again, 
it is clear that the parties meant the same thing with their 
reference to the GT40. And thus, taking the contract term GT40 
to reference this car of a slightly different name accomplishes 
the concordant intent that the parties had when contracting, that 
is, it provides for the sale of two of the cars that Ford 
announced and produced on the heels of the GT4 0 concept car that 
was unveiled at the 2 0 02 auto show. Because Henry Day received 
three such cars and did not sell two to Watkins for MSRP, Henry 
Day breached the contracts--assuming they had not been abandoned 
and that Watkins had not waived his rights thereunder. 
II. Abandonment/Waiver 
fl7 The trial court determined that Watkins had abandoned the 
contracts and waived his rights thereunder by his acceptance of 
Henry Day's return of his deposit. Waiver and abandonment 
involve the intentional relinquishment of a known right. See 
Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'nf 857 P.2d 935, 
942 (Utah 1993) ("A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing 
right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an 
intention to relinquish it. We further clarify that the intent 
4Henry Day somewhat disingenuously argues that it is not 
clear that there was a name change from the GT40 to the GT and 
that they could be references to different cars. However, we see 
ample evidence of this name change. First, there is the article 
before the trial court that calls the concept car the GT40 and 
calls the production model based thereon the GT. While Henry Day 
argues that the article uses the terms GT40 and GT 
"interchangeably," we think that the article doing so would be 
even more of an indication that the two terms reference the same 
car. Second, Henry Day's general manager testified that although 
he was not personally certain, he believed that the GT had 
earlier been introduced as the GT40 and that the evidence showed 
that. Third, the findings of fact state that in December 2002, 
Henry Day's general manager called its Ford representative, who 
said that Henry Day would not "be allotted any Ford GT 40's 
unless [Henry Day] won [certain awards]." (Emphasis added.) But 
when Henry Day went on to win three of those specified awards, it 
was allocated three Ford GTs. 
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to relinquish a right must be distinct." (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 
P.2d 750, 753 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("Abandonment means the 
intentional relinquishment of one's rights in the contract; and 
in order to nullify such rights, there must be a clear and 
unequivocal showing of such abandonment."). There is simply no 
intentional relinquishment of a known right in this case. 
1[l8 The trial court determined that Watkins demonstrated an 
intentional relinquishment of his known rights when he negotiated 
the check returning his deposit "without reservation or 
objection," particularly in light of Watkins's "experience in the 
auto dealership industry and both parties' uncertainty as to when 
and if defendant would receive the contracted vehicles." But 
even considering both Watkins's experience in the industry--
assuming such experience was even relevant to the circumstances 
of this transaction--and the parties' initial uncertainty as to 
whether Henry Day would receive the subject cars, there is simply 
no evidence whatsoever indicating that Watkins knew he still had 
rights under the contracts at the time he negotiated the check 
refunding his deposit. The letter accompanying the check was an 
unequivocal representation by Henry Day that its prior 
uncertainty regarding allocation had been resolved and that it 
now knew it would not be receiving any of the subject cars. Had 
this representation been true, then the parties would have known 
that a condition precedent to the contracts was definitely not 
going to happen and they therefore would no longer have had any 
rights or obligations under the contracts.5 See Harper v. Great 
Salt Lake Council, Inc., 1999 UT 34, % 14, 976 P.2d 1213 ("Under 
well-established principles of contract interpretation, where the 
duty of the obligor to perform is contingent upon the occurrence 
or existence of a condition precedent, the obligee may not 
require performance by the obligor, because the obligor's duty, 
and conversely the obligee's right to demand performance, does 
not arise until that condition occurs or exists. Failure of a 
material condition precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to 
5In its ambiguity argument, Henry Day argued that Watkins 
should have requested that the contracts be modified when he 
discovered that the cars would be released under the name GT as 
opposed to GT40. Even if we were somehow convinced that Watkins 
would be under such a burden, Henry Day's argument is unavailing. 
The name modification apparently occurred subsequent to the 
letter informing Watkins that the condition precedent in the 
contracts would not occur. Thus, after receiving this letter, 
Watkins would have justifiably thought he no longer had any 
rights under the contracts and would have had no reason to 
attempt to modify the contractual terms to reflect the name 
change. 
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perform." (citation omitted)). See generally McBride-Williams v. 
Huard, 2004 UT 21, f 13, 94 P.3d 175 ("'Condition precedent' is 
defined as 'an act or event, other than a lapse of time, that 
must exist or occur before a duty to perform something promised 
arises.'" (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 289 (7th ed. 1999))). 
i|l9 Henry Day seems to argue that notwithstanding the 
unequivocal representation regarding the condition precedent, 
Watkins was still required to object to the refund of his deposit 
to preserve his contractual rights. But we have been referred to 
no legal authority for this position and can conceive of no 
policy reason requiring Watkins to distrust Henry Day's 
representation. There was nothing that would have given Watkins 
any reason to doubt the accuracy or truth of the information 
relayed by Henry Day. And the crucial information regarding 
nonoccurrence of the condition precedent is something that 
Watkins had no way of independently verifying.6 Under these 
circumstances, there was simply no relinquishment by Watkins of a 
known right, and we reverse the trial court on this issue.7 
Because we have determined that Henry Day breached the contracts 
and that Watkins did not abandon the contracts or waive his 
rights thereunder, we remand to the trial court for a 
determination of the damages to be awarded to Watkins for Henry 
Day's breach of the contracts. 
6Indeed, if we were to impose the burden on Watkins that 
Henry Day suggests, it appears that in order to ensure he did not 
abandon his rights under the contracts Watkins would have had to 
wait until the entire production run of the Ford GTs had been 
completed and all the cars were delivered to dealerships before 
negotiating the $2 000 check. He would simply have no other way 
to know with certainty of the failure of the condition precedent 
of the contracts. 
7The trial court made a finding that Henry Day "returned 
[Watkins]'s check in good faith and based upon the reasonable 
belief they would not be allotted any Ford GT 40's." But whether 
Henry Day was acting in good faith by making an educated guess is 
irrelevant--it does not change the information actually given to 
Watkins, which information tells us whether Watkins was 
relinquishing a known right. 
Further, notwithstanding any good faith, the unequivocal 
statement from Henry Day was simply incorrect. See generally 31 
C.J.S. Estoppel & Waiver § 218 (2008) ("A waiver may not be 
claimed by one whose false representation is the foundation of 
the waiver."). Henry Day knew that there existed some 
possibility, no matter how slim, that Henry Day would get one of 
the subject cars. 
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III. Failure to Mitigate 
|^20 " [U] nder the doctrine of avoidable consequences the 
nonbreaching party has an active duty to mitigate his damages, 
and he may not, either by action or inaction, aggravate the 
injury occasioned by the breach." Mahmood v. Ross (In re Estate 
of Ross), 1999 UT 104, 1 31, 990 P.2d 933 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).8 Although Watkins may have had the opportunity 
and duty to mitigate his damages here, there are not sufficient 
factual findings by the trial court to support such a conclusion; 
most importantly, there is no finding as to the actual value of 
the GT at the time Henry Day eventually offered to sell it to 
Watkins for MSRP. The lack of findings is probably largely due 
to the fact that the trial court determined there had been no 
breach of the contracts and therefore never arrived at a 
determination of damages. We therefore must vacate the trial 
court's ruling respecting Watkins's failure to mitigate and 
remand to the trial court to revisit this issue. On remand, the 
trial court should make the findings necessary to determine 
whether Watkins failed to mitigate his damages, including a 
determination of the value of the subject cars at the time Henry 
Day offered to sell one to Watkins at MSRP in the late summer of 
2005 and whether it would have resulted in a financial benefit to 
Watkins. 
IV. Attorney Fees 
if21 The contracts at issue provided that Henry Day was entitled 
to recover "reasonable attorney[] fees, court costs, and 
collection fees" should it need to enforce the contracts. And 
the Utah Code provides a reciprocal right to recover attorney 
fees: 
A court may award costs and attorney 
fees to either party that prevails in a civil 
action based upon any promissory note, 
written contract, or other writing executed 
after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of 
the promissory note, written contract, or 
other writing allow at least one party to 
recover attorney fees. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2008) . The trial court awarded Henry 
Day its reasonable attorney fees and costs due to its prevailing 
It is Henry Day that bears the burden "to prove with 
reasonable certainty" the amounts that were made or could have 
been made in mitigation. See Pratt v. Board of Educ., 564 P.2d 
294, 297-98 (Utah 1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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status below. But because we determine that Watkins has 
prevailed on his breach of contract claims, we reverse the award 
of attorney fees and costs to Henry Day and remand for the trial 
court to enter an appropriate award of attorney fees and costs in 
favor of Watkins, including those fees and costs reasonably 
incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
if22 First, we determine that the trial court was correct that 
there was no facial ambiguity in the contracts at issue here. 
However, we determine the later renaming of the car created a 
latent ambiguity. We therefore consider evidence of the intent 
of the parties at the time of contracting and determine that the 
parties intended to buy and sell what is now referred to as a 
Ford GT, and thus, Henry Day breached the contracts by refusing 
to sell such cars upon receipt to Watkins for MSRP. Second, we 
reverse the trial court on the issue of abandonment and waiver 
because the facts simply do not support the determination that 
Watkins was intentionally relinquishing any known right. Thus, 
we remand to the trial court for a determination of the amount of 
damages to be awarded to Watkins. Third, the trial court did not 
make findings necessary to determine whether the facts here show 
a failure by Watkins to mitigate his damages. We therefore 
vacate the trial court's mitigation determination and remand to 
the trial court for further consideration of this matter. 
Finally, in light of the outcome on appeal, we reverse the award 
of attorney fees and costs in favor of Henry Day and remand for 
the trial court to determine an appropriate award of attorney 
fees and costs to Watkins. 
James Z. Davis, 
Presiding Judge 
f23 I CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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THORNE, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part): 
il24 I concur in the analysis of Parts I and III of the majority 
opinion. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority's 
reversal of the trial court's abandonment determination in Part 
II and therefore dissent from Part IV as well. I do not agree 
with the majority's determination that Watkins's negotiation of 
the return of deposit check was not an intentional relinquishment 
of his contractual rights. See supra f 19. 
if25 The contracts entered into between the parties gave Watkins 
a right to purchase two of the subject cars contingent upon 
allocation of the cars to Henry Day. However, "[a] contract may 
be [abandoned] by acts or conduct of the parties inconsistent 
with the continued existence of the contract." Harris v. IES 
Assocs. , Inc. , 2003 UT App 112, i| 37, 69 P.3d 297 (second 
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 
this case, both parties undertook acts inconsistent with the 
continued existence of the contracts.9 
i[26 Henry Day acted inconsistently with the contracts when it 
refunded the deposit Watkins gave as security for the performance 
of the contracts. Watkins acted inconsistently when he accepted 
the return of his deposit and negotiated the deposit check. 
These actions demonstrate the parties' unequivocal expressions of 
an intent to abandon the contracts. If Watkins, after receiving 
the refund check and letter from Henry Day indicating its desire 
to abandon the contracts, wanted to maintain rights under the 
contracts, he should not have taken actions that were 
inconsistent with the continued existence of the contracts. 
Instead of either seeking a clarification or asserting ongoing 
rights, Watkins negotiated the deposit check. The result was 
that both parties acted as if the contracts had been rescinded. 
i|27 Watkins's negotiation of the deposit check indicated his 
agreement to "walk away" from the deal and abandon the contracts. 
By negotiating the returned deposit check, Watkins released Henry 
Day of its obligation to sell any future allocation of the 
subject cars to Watkins and Henry Day relinquished its right to 
enforce purchase at the manufacturer's suggested retail price 
9It is possible that the parties' actions of mutual 
abandonment of the contracts in this case may amount to a 
manifestation of mutual assent to rescind the contracts. See 
generally Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah 1980) 
(per curiam) ("[W]hen the intent to abandon by one party is 
coupled with the equal intention of the other party, such mutual 
abandonment may under certain circumstances, be found to 
constitute rescission of the contract."). 
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(MSRP) of the cars if they were allocated to Henry Day. The 
issuance of the deposit check and Watkins's negotiation of the 
check without any visible attempt to claim continuing rights 
demonstrated an unequivocal representation of intent to abandon 
the contracts. See generally Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 
755 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating that abandonment 
is the intentional relinquishment of one's right in the 
contract). Because Watkins abandoned the contracts, I would not 
permit Watkins to enforce the sale of the subject cars pursuant 
to those contracts. Likewise, if the situation were reversed and 
Henry Day was attempting to enforce the sale of the subject cars, 
for example if the market value dropped significantly below MSRP 
before delivery of the cars to Henry Day, I would not likewise 
permit Henry Day to enforce the contracts. 
f28 I also do not agree with the majority opinion that Watkins 
could not have relinquished his rights because Watkins was 
unaware, after Henry Day's negative representation regarding 
allocation, that there remained a possibility that Henry Day 
would receive an allocation of the subject cars if the dealership 
received a sales award. See supra f 19. Under the contracts, 
Watkins had a contingent right to purchase the subject cars 
regardless of how likely or unlikely the possibility of Henry 
Day's allocation might be at any given time throughout the 
duration of the contracts. Henry Day's desire to abandon the 
contracts based on its own belief that it would not receive an 
allocation did nothing to change Watkins's contingent contractual 
rights. Thus, the parties' beliefs regarding the probability 
that Henry Day would receive an allocation of the subject cars is 
irrelevant. At the time Watkins received the refund check, he 
had a contingent right to purchase the subject cars if. later 
allocated to Henry Day. Watkins, however, relinquished his 
contractual rights when he negotiated the return of deposit 
check. 
H29 Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's abandonment 
determination. 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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SALT LAKE COUNTV 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TOM WATKINS, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HENRY DAY FORD, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 050911728 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
The above-entitled matter having come before this Court for trial on March 3, 2009, the 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, presiding. Plaintiff was present and represented by his attorneys, John 
B. Wilson and John P. Ball. Defendant was represented by its attorney, Robert W. Hughes. The 
Court having heard the argument of counsel, received evidence and testimony, reviewed the 
pleadings and papers filed in this matter, including supplemental Memoranda submitted on or about 
March 9, 2009, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff has been an owner of one or more motor vehicle dealerships since 1989 and 
has been involved in the retail automobile business in various capacities since 1968. 
2. In 2002 Ford announced that it was going to build the Ford GT 40. 
3. Also on March 2,2002, plaintiff offered to pay defendant $ 1,000.00 for each vehicle 
as a down payment. 
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4. At the time plaintiff met with Mr. Kersey, defendant did not have any GT 40's in its 
inventory. 
5. The first meeting between Mr. Kersey and the plaintiff lasted about 15 minutes. 
During the meeting Mr. Kersey did not leave, nor did Mr. Kersey speak with anyone else about the 
plaintiffs requested purchase. 
6. Mr. Kersey during this meeting indicated to the plaintiff that he would have to speak 
with the General Manager of defendant when he returned to work on Monday to obtain permission 
to accept plaintiffs offer to purchase two (2) GT 40 automobiles. 
7. The following Monday Steve Kersey did meet with the General Manager and inquired 
whether he could enter into the transaction to sell two (2) Ford GT 40's to the plaintiff. 
8. Though defendant did not have any GT 40fs on its lot, nor did the dealership know 
if it would be allocated any GT 40!s to sell, at that time Mr. Kersey was given permission to enter 
into a contracts) to sell plaintiff Ford GT 40 automobiles, if such vehicles were allotted to 
defendant. 
9. Mr. Kersey called the plaintiff the following Monday and indicated that defendant 
would sell the plaintiff two (2) GT 40 automobiles if defendant was allocated the vehicles. 
10. Later that same Monday, the plaintiff came to the defendant's location and Mr. 
Kersey prepared two (2) written Motor Vehicle Contracts of Sale (the "Contracts"), dated March 4, 
2002, for Ford GT 40 automobiles. 
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11. It was undisputed that plaintiff specifically requested that defendant sell him Ford GT 
40 automobiles and plaintiffs request was specifically referenced in the Contracts which were 
executed by the plaintiff and defendant. 
12. Mr. Kersey's meeting on March 4,2002 with Mr. Watkins lasted approximately 15 
minutes during which time Mr. Kersey again did not leave the room where he and Mr. Watkins were 
meeting and again he did not speak to anyone regarding whether defendant would be allocated any 
Ford GT 40's. 
13. Plaintiff reviewed the Contracts which specified that the automobile to be purchased 
by plaintiff was a Ford "GT 40", found them to be accurate, and signed both written Contracts, as 
did Mr. Kersey on behalf of defendant. 
14. The plaintiff offered to pay a deposit for each GT 40 and the defendant required a 
deposit of $1,000.00 before the contract would be prepared. 
15. The plaintiff did tender to the defendant $1,000.00 for each automobile and the 
defendant did accept plaintiffs deposit. 
16. Each Contract specified a down payment in the amount of $ 1,000.00. 
17. Each of the Contracts also provided in the "memo" portion of the Contract as 
follows: "MEMO: deposits on GT40". 
18. None of the Contracts executed by the parties specified a delivery date. At the time 
the parties executed the Contracts, defpndant was uncertain as to when or if it would receive the Ford 
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GT 40's. PlaintifFbelieved at the time the Contracts were executed that it could take as long as two 
years for defendant to receive the Ford GT 40's. 
19. The following day the plaintiff called Mr. Kersey and indicated that he wanted the 
Contracts modified to include the purchase price was for MSRP. 
20. The plaintiff did not indicate in this later call in which he requested the Contracts be 
modified that the Contracts were in error or needed any further modifications. 
21. Mr. Kersey included the requested language in the Contracts and faxed the Contracts 
as modified to the plaintiff. 
22. At no time in 2002 did plaintiff ask to purchase a Ford GT from defendant. 
23. At the end of 2002, after defendant had held plaintiffs deposit for over eight months, 
Jeremy Day inquired why plaintiffs deposit was being held since there had been no indication that 
the defendant would be allocated any Ford GT 40!s. 
24. Jeremy Day, in December of 2002, called the defendant's Ford representative to 
inquire if defendant would be allotted any Ford GT 40's. 
25. Ford indicated to Mr. Day, in effect, that the defendant was not, as a smaller Ford 
dealer going to be allotted any Ford GT 40's unless the defendant won the Ford President's Award 
or Ford's National Car and Truck Share Award. 
26. Defendant had never, in its 40 year history, received either the President's Award or 
National Share Award from Ford. 
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27. Based upon the fact that defendant would not be allocated a Ford GT40 to sell, the 
defendant, on December 31,2002, returned plaintiffs $2,000.00 deposit with a letter which stated: 
"[ejnclosed please find a check for the refund of deposit on your vehicle order. We regret to inform 
you that our allocation is not going to allow us to receive this vehicle." 
28. Though plaintiff, as noted above is an experienced automobile dealer and as such 
would be very familiar with industry practices, he negotiated the return of his deposit without 
objection or reservation of any type. Based upon plaintiffs experience in the auto dealership 
industry, plaintiffs claim that he deposited the check because he did not know what to do with the 
check lacks credibility. Plaintiff made no attempt whatsoever to communicate any concerns he had 
with the letter and the check, nor made any attempts within a reasonable time of receiving the letter 
and check to assert or enforce his contract rights. 
29. It was not until February 2004, over two years after plaintiff accepted the return of 
his deposit, that defendant learned that it would be allocated a Ford GT based upon defendant being 
awarded the Share of the Nation Award for the 2003 sales year. 
30. In April 2004, defendant was notified by Ford that it would be receiving the 
President's Award based upon defendant's 2003 automobile sales and would be allocated another 
Ford GT. 
31. Ford invoiced defendant for the first Ford GT on December 9,2004. 
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32. Defendant received actual delivery of the December 9, 2004 invoiced Ford GT on 
May 31,2005. 
33. Ford invoiced defendant for the second Ford GT on May 31, 2005. 
34. The Ford GT represented in the May 31, 2005 was not available for delivery until 
July 20, 2005 
35. In June of 2005 the plaintiff for the first time demanded defendant sell him aFord GT 
model vehicle even though the plaintiff had contracted to purchase Ford GT 40 vehicles and plaintiff 
had accepted without objection the return of his deposit. 
36. Defendant refused to sell to plaintiff in June of 2005 a Ford GT vehicle. 
37. In or about the summer of 2005, defendant was informed by Ford that it would be 
allocated a Ford GT. 
38. In the late summer of 2005, defendant offered to sell to plaintiff for MSRP the Ford 
GT which had been allocated to defendant. 
39. Plaintiff refused defendant's offer to purchase a Ford GT. Plaintiffs refusal to 
purchase the Ford GT constitutes a failure of plaintiff to mitigate his damages. 
40. Plaintiff, by his acceptance of his deposit without reservation, objection, or condition, 
unequivocally demonstrated his abandonment of the Contracts. 
41. Plaintiffs demand that the Contracts be honored by defendant over two (2) years after 
plaintiff accepted a return of his deposit is unreasonable. The Court finds that defendant returned 
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plaintiffs check in good faith and based upon the reasonable belief they would not be allotted any 
FordGT40's. 
42. Plaintiff, by his actions, unequivocally demonstrated his intent to relinquish his rights 
to purchase the subject vehicles from defendant. 
The Court having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact, now makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Contracts are clear and unambiguous and were intended to be the final and 
complete expression of the parties' bargain. 
2. The Contracts between the parties are integrated agreements. 
3. The Court is required to interpret the parties' contracts based upon the plain meaning 
contained in the Contracts. 
4. The Contracts provided that defendant was to sell to plaintiff a "Ford GT 40". 
5. Defendant has not been allocated a Ford GT 40 and, as such, defendant did not breach 
the parties' Contracts and, as such, plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed. 
6. The Contracts specifically provide that plaintiff contracted to purchase two (2) "Ford 
GT 40" automobiles. Plaintiff now claims that he contracted to purchase Ford GT automobiles, 
which claim differs from the actual Contracts. 
7. Plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance of the Contracts. 
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8. Defendant's return of plaintiff s deposit represented conduct inconsistent with the 
continued existence of the Contract, and plaintiffs negotiation of defendant's check in the amount 
of $2,000.00 without reservation or objection constituted conduct inconsistent with the continued 
existence of the Contract after the plaintiff negotiated the return of his deposit. 
9. The Court finds the parties abandoned the Contracts. 
10. Plaintiffs acceptance of the return of his deposit and his subsequent inaction clearly 
demonstrate plaintiffs voluntary relinquishment of his known rights particularly with plaintiffs 
experience in the auto dealership industry and both parties' uncertainty as to when and if defendant 
would receive the contracted vehicles. 
11. Defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts and, as such, plaintiffs Complaint 
must be dismissed. 
12. Defendant is awarded its reasonable attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be 
proven by Affidavit. Counsel for defendant is instructed to submit a Judgment and Affidavit in 
support of reasonable attorney fees and costs consistent with the Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Rule 7(f), Utah R. Civ. P. 
Dated this ^> day of May, 2009. 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, to the following, this_^day of May, 2009: 
John B. Wilson 
John P. Ball 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Robert W. Hughes 
Attorney for Defendant 
438 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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NOTICE ONLY TO BUYERS OF USED VEHICLES 
The information /ou see on the window form [Buyer s Guide) for this vehicle is part of this contract 
Information on the window form overndes any contrary provisions in the contract of sale 
I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE FTC USED CAR BUYERS GUIDE 
TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS FINANCING DISCLOSURE 
INSTRUCTION One of the two (ollowinq disclosures either "A or "B must be acknowledged !( 
Purchaser agrees to be responsible for financing or il this is a cash only or cash plus trade In only 
transaction then Purchaser must sign disclosure "A" If Spllpr agr°ps to arrange for financing then both 
Seller and Purchaser must sign disclosure "8" BY S GNING PURCHASER AFFIRMS THAT HE/SHE 
HAS REAO THE DISCLOSURE AND AGREES THERETO IF SIGNING DISCLOSURE B DO 
MOT SIGN UNTIL ALL BLANKS HAVE BEEN FILLED IN 
N C E O W E D O N T R A D E IN 
^JCE O W E D T O 
E S S 
N/A 
c D B Y 
O F 
I C A T I O N 
G O O D 
U N T I L 
ACC n 
PURCHASER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING 
"{A}" THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT ACKNOWL 
EDGES THAT THE SELLER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS MADE NO PROMISES WARRANTIES 
OR REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING SELLERS ABILITY TO OBTAIN FINANCING FOR THE 
PURCHASE OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE FURTHERMORE PURCHASER UNDERSTANDS THAT IF 
FINANCING IS NECESSARY IN ORDER FOR THE PURCHASER TO COMPLETE THE PAYMENT 
TERMS OF THIS CONTRACT ALL THE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS ARE THE SOLE RESPON 
SIBILTY OF THE PURCHASER 
SIGNATURE 
OF PURCHASER 
A N T Y A S T O B A L A N C E O W E D O N T R A D E D IN V E H I C L E 
r war ants that he/she has given Seller a true pav off amount on any 
arjpd n and that if t is not rorrert and is greater than th* amount shown 
urctncer
 WiH pay he excess to Seller on demand 
SELLER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING 
"(B) THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBFD IN THIS CONTRACT HAS 
EXECUTED THE CONTRACT IN RELIANCE UPON THE SELLERS REPRESENTATION THAT 
SELLER CAN PROVIDE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE MOTOR 
VEHICLE THE PRIMARY TERMS OF THE FINANCING ARE AS FOLLOWS 
INTEREST RATE BFtWEEN _ 
VDE IN ALLOWANCE 
jMCE OWFD 014 TRADE IN 
ALLOWANCE UN TRADE IN (line 10 minus 11) 
'OSIT/CASH DOWN PAYMENT (omu amt line £ 
AL CREDITS 
J TOTAL FROM LINE 9 
(total lines 12 & 13) 
(VICE CONTRACT 
I TOTAL TAXABLE ITEMS (total lines 15 17) 
OE ALLOWANCE (line 10) 
TAXABLE AMOUNT 
(line 18 minus line 19) |S 
N/Q 
H SALES/USE TAX ON TAXABLE AMOUNT 
• M / .Q . 
NSE & REGISTRATION FEES 
PERPf- ASSESSMENT FEE(S) 
fE INSPECTION/EMISSIONS TEST 
E WASTE TIRE RECYCLING FEE 
RAL LUXURY TAX 
LER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE 
\l OF ALL ITEMS ABOVE (lines 18 2127) 
\l CREDITS (line 14) 
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MONTH _YEAR 
(total line 29 minus 30) 
N / C & A N O . 
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-MZflJ 
N/f l 
_ R £ 0 P E R MONTH AND $ . 
\ PER ANNUM TERM BETWFEN 
_ MONTHS MONTHLY PAYMENTS 












• N / Q 
BETWEEN $ 
ON A DOWN PAYMENT OF $_ 
IF SELLER IS NOT ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING WITHIN THE TERMS DISCLOSED THEN 
SELLER MUST WITHIN SEVEN CALENOAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF SALE MAIL NOTICE TO THE 
PURCHASER THAT HE/SHE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING PURCHASER THEN 
HAS 14 DAYS FROM DATE OF SALE TO E^ECT IF HE/SHE CHOOSES TO RESCIND THE 
CONTRACT OF SALE PURSUANT TO SECTION 41 3-401 
IN ORDER TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE THE PURCHASER SHALL 
(1) RETURN TO SELLER THE MOTOR VEHICLE PURCHASED 
(2) PAY THE SELLER 30 CENTS FOR EACH MILE THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN ANO 
(3) COMPENSATE SELLER FOR ANY PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE 
IN RETURN SELLER SHALL GfVE BACK TO THE PURCHASER ALL PAYMENTS OR OTHER 
CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE PURCHASER INCLUDING AMY GOWN PAYMENT ANO ANY 
MOTOR VEHICLE TRADED IN IF THE TRADE IN HAS BEEN SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF 
BEFORE THE PURCHASER RESCINDS THE TRANSACTION THEN THE SELLER SHALL RETURN 
TO THE PURCHASER A SUM EQUIVALENT TO THE ALLOWANCE TOWARD THE PURCHASE 
PRICE GIVEN BY THE SELLER FOR THE TRADE IN AS NOTED IN THE DOCUMENT OF SALF 






369. 50 5HER TERMS AGREED TO NONE • AS FOLLOWS • l ^ G T L/O 
4 0 0 0 . 00 0£S>r£eo e>^  I t ^ ^ D^j K>KD 
*s arranged insurance on vehicle through 
on the reverse side of this document unless Seller has 
licular purpose ot otherwise concerning the vehicle 
f any as explained and conditioned by Paragraph 4 on tl 
- < S S » g 0 Sf--Gsi~cli 
. nsurance company Policy I _ 
2v-
given to Purchaser an 
parts or accessones 
TO reverse side hereof 
Express Warranty in wrrtino, Sailer makes no Warranty express or implied with respect to the merchantability 
descnbed herein Unless otherwise indicated in writing any warranty is hmiled to that provided by the 
irees thai his contract ncludes all of the terms conditions and warranties on both the lace and reverse side hereof that this agreempnt cancers and supersedes any pnor agreement and as of 
eof comprises the complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the subject matters covered hereby PURCHASER BY HIS/HER EXECUTION OF THIS 
T ACKNOWLEDGES W A L S E / S H E HAS READ ITS TERMS CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE AND THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF ANO HAS RECEIVED A TRUE 
<IS A Q R £ E M £ N T J H : $ W £ R AGREES TO PAY THE 'BALANCE DUE" SET FORTH ABOVE ON OR BEFORE THE DATE SPECIFIEB 
ntTC 0 3 / 0 4 / 0 2 V 4 ? & E T O 8 E -
HENRY DAY FORD iNC 
3899 5 REDWOOD ROAD 
WEST Mftl LFY T H Y UT 84119 
DATE OF SALE 
JDh WQTKINS 
PJRCHASERS NAME 
2537 EAST 6200 SOUTH 
STREET ADDRESS 
SALT LAKE CITY SALT LAKE UT 84121 
CITY 
(801)278-1913 
vt haser and Co Pu rhas*> (s) f any (hereahe referred to as Purchased) hereby agree to purchase the follow ng vehcie from Seller/Oeiter (hereane referred o as SelleO subject lo 
i inms condit ons warrani es and agreements conta ned here n lnclud ng those pnnted on the reverse s de hereof 
^E / j USED 







V 5TFVT KERSEY 
P U R C H A S E P R I C E A N D O T H E R S U M S D U E 
1 CASH PRICE OP VEHICLE 
? ACCESSORIES OPTIONS 
3 
TOTAL CASH PRICE (add lines 1 5) 
MFR REBATE N/fl 
I PORTION/REBATE APPLIED TO PURCHASE 









THIS SECTION FOR SELLER S USE ONLY PERTAINING TO TRADE IN 











NOTICE ONLY TO BUYERS OF USED VEHICLES 
The informat ion you see on the w i n d o w form [Buyer s GuKte| for his vehic le is part of this contract 
Informat ion on the w indow fo rm over r ides any contrary provis ons in the contract of sale 
I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY O F THE F T C USED CAR BUYERS GUIDE 
TRADE IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS FINANCING DISCLOSURE 
INSTRUCTION One of the two lo l lowmg disclosures either A or "B must be acknowledged If 
Purchaser agrees to be responsible for f inancing or if this is a cash only or cash plus trade in only 
transaction then Purchaser must sign disclosure A" If Seller agrees to arrange for financing then both 
Seller and Purchaser must s ign disclosure "B" BY SIGNING PURCHASER AFFIRMS THAT HE/SHE 
HAS READ THE DISCLOSURE AND A G R E E S THERETO IF SIGNING DISCLOSURE B DO 
NOT SIGN UNTIL A L L B L A N K S HAVE B E E N FILLED IN 
BALANCE OWED ON 











PURCHASER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING 
" (A) THE PURCHASER O F T H E M O T O R VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT A C K N O W L 
EDGES THAT THE SELLER O F T H E M O T O R VEHICLE HAS MADE NO PROMISES WARRANTIES 
OR REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING SELLER S ABILITY TO OBTAIN FINANCING FOR T H E 
PURCHASE OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE FURTHERMORE PURCHASER UNDERSTANDS THAT IF 
FINANCING IS NECESSARY IN ORDER FOR THE PURCHASER TO COMPLETE THE PAYMENT 
TERMS O F THIS CONTRACT ALL THE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS ARE THE SOLE R E S P O N 
SIBILTY OF THE PURCHASER 
SIGNATURE 
OF PURCHASER 
A R R A N T Y A S T O B A L A N C E O W E D O N T R A D E D IN V E H I C L E 
rhaser warrants that he/she has g ven Seller a true pay off amount on any 
rle raded in and thai f t is -not correct and s greater than the amount shown 
\/p Purchaser * II pa/ the exceso to S^lle on d«»mand 
SELLER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING 
(B)M THE PURCHASER OF T H E MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS C O N T R A C T HAS 
EXECUTED THE CONTRACT IN RELIANCE UPON THE SELLER S REPRESENTATION THAT 
SELLER CAN PROVIDE F INANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE MOTOR 
VEHICLE THE PRIMARY T E R M S O F T H E FINANCING ARE * S F O L L O W S 
INTEREST RATE BETWEEN _ JLUfr AND _ 
TRADE IN ALLOWANCE 
BALANCE OWFD OH TRADE IN 
NET ALLOWANCE ON TRADF IN (line 10 minus 11) 
DEpQSi1/CASH OQWN PAYMENT (omit amt line £ 
TOTAL CREDITS (total linos i2&13) 
SUB TOTAL FROM LINE Q 
SERVICE CONTRACT 
SUB TOTAL TAXABLE ITEMS (total lines 15 17) 
TRADE ALLOWANCE (line 1 
NFF TAXABLE AMOUNT 
(line 18 minus line 19) 
N/fl 
UTAH SALES/USE TAX ON TAXABLE AMOUNT 
N/fl 
LICENSE & REGISTRATION FEES 
PROPERTY ASSESSMENT FEE(S) 
STATE INSPECTION/EMISSIONS TEST 
STATE WASTE TIRE RECYCLING FEE 
FEDERAL LUXURY TAX 
DEALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE 
TOTAL OF ALL ITEMS ABOVE (lines 18 2127) 
TOTAL CREDITS (line 14) 
BALANCE DUE 
MONTH YEAR 
(total line 29 minus 30) 
J±2£L -4f/A- _ M O N T H S A N D . 
M/Q 
N/fl 
N / f l PER MONTH AND $.. 
JLa0£L_C0_ 
_°, PER ANNUM TERMBFrWEEN 
_ MONTHS MONTHLY PAYMENTS 














ON A DOWN PAYMENT OF $ _ 
IF SELLER IS NOT ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCINC WITHIN THE TERMS DISCLOSED THEN 
SELLER MUST WITHIN SEVEN CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF SALE MA L NOTICE TO THE 
PURCHASER THAT HE/SHE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING PURCHASER THEN 
HAS 14 DAYS FROM DATE OF SALE TO ELECT IF HE/SHE CHOOSES TO RESCIND THE 
CONTRACT OF SALE PURSUANT TO SECTION 41 3 401 
IN ORDER TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE THE PURCHASER SHALL 
(1) RETURN TO SELLER T H E MOTOR VEHICLE PURCHASED 
(2) PAY THE SELLER 30 CENTS FOR EACH MILE THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN AND 
(3) COMPENSATE SELLER FOR A N Y PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE 
IN RETURN SELLER SHALL GIVE BACK TO THE PURCHASER ALL PAYMENTS OR OTHER 
CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE PURCHASER INCLUDING ANY D O W N PAYMENT A N D ANY 
MOTOR VEHICLE TRADED IN IF THE TRADE IN HAS BEEN SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF 
BEFORE THE PURCHASER RESCINDS THE TRANSACTION THEN THE SELLER SHALL RETURN 
TO THE PURCHASER A S U M EQUIVALENT TO THE ALLOWANCE TOWARD THE PURCHASE 
PRICE GIVEN BY THE SELLER FOR THE TRADE IN AS NOTED IN THE DOCUMENT OF SALE 








( jgiflf l.ftgi) 
OTHER TERMS AGREED TO 
^610,50 
NONE • AS FOLLOWS D 
2_ ^ Qrr u o 
A T 
^Xt 
iser has arranged insurance on vehicle through _ _ insurance company Policy t _ 
stated on the reverse side of this document unless Seller has gwen to Purchaser an Express Warranty tn writing Seller makes no Warranty express o( implied with respect to the merchantability 
for particular purpose or otherwise concerning the vehicle parts or accessories described herein Unless otherwise indicated m wnttng any warranty is Imited lo *hal provided by the 
if any as explained and conditioned by Paragraph 4 on the reverse side hereof 
yees that this contract includes all of the terms conditions and warranties on both the lace and reverse side hereof that this agreement cancels and supersedes any prior aqreement and as of 
te hereof comprises the complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relatng to the subject matters covered hereby PURCHASER BY HIS/HER EXECUTION OF THIS 
MENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HE/SHE HAS READ ITS TERMS CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE AND THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF AND HAS RECEIVED A TRUE 
OF THIS AGREEMENT ANDlFtJftTMEB AGREES TO PAY THE BALANCE DUE" SET FORTH ABOVE ON OR BEFORE THE DATE SPECIFIED 
JRE 
;HASER. 
( 3 3 / 0 4 / 0 2 VEHICLE TO BE 
OATE TTTLEDWNAMEOF_ 
' 31 / f l f r / f l ° 
M a r - - 0 5 - 0 2 0 5 : 1 3 P Henr-y Day F o r d F l e e t 8 0 1 9 7 5 2 6 1 9 P . 0 2 
SELLER/DEALER. MOTOR VEHICLE CONTRACT OF SALE 03/34/(32 
D€OL *: 1961 
DATE OF SALE 
HENRY DPY FORD INC 
3B9S S REDWOOD ROAD 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84H9 
•HJflJfflTftifctS,. 
2337 EAST 62*3 SOUTH 
SALT LAHE CITY SALT LAKE UT 84121 
CI TV 
( W l > 8 7 8 - 1 9 i 3 
p«*th»5««' »nO Co-Purcru3«ffs|. if aity. (h«f««rt«f f r *»«*d ic * i 'Pu»< hAN<y) "•'^<»y - v y * * »o pu'cn»-M in* .'r>iio««.wj vHw-ir i 
«l ivmt. co<»a»tioni, w«fr*r*y»« «nd »gr««m«nU coni»»n«0 l"N«»«tn, lnauem<j ino#« om'Ud on tfvo f«v««»« «W« n««to«. 
!-f/r>-:il«T (»»'ir.i/l«M •O. .,.!.,,-, 
XX 
u«o OEMO YEA* 
FORD 
semes 
GT 43 GT 4« 
• «/8*/ f i2 
SAltb^tHbO* 
V 5TFVF KFBSEL 
PURCHASE PRICE ANO OTHER SUMS DUE 
\ CASH PRICf OF VEHICLE I N/R 
2 ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS 
6. TOTAL CASH PRICE (acid lines 1 -5) 
7 MfR. REBATE N / q 
8 PORTION/REBATE APPLIED TO PURCHASE 







AWARRANTY AS TO BALANCE OWED ON TRAOED-lN VEHICLE: 
|Mufv-n;iy«;r r/.inU'iU» l luil I lutein: Uau y*v*in Sollvr 4 i r u * pay-o/l amounl nn any 
rr*rt*d m. .-»nd ihni rf it e« not c t v i p ^ ;»vt is QfcatCi WHIM U«J «UIWVJ»I< J » U W * I 
j O o v y , Purct'UJuvr v»ill pay <fi« wxcuss to 3*»i\«r on d « m * n d , 
-4UA-
TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS 
'8ALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN: 










10. TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE 
i I BALANCE OWEO ON TRAOE-IN"'" 
12. NET ALLOWANCE ON TRADE-IN (Hue U) rmrwis 11) 
13. OEf'OSiTOSH DOWN J'AYMtrJT (nmrt .wrrt. hnr. a) 
14. KKALCHEUliS (trial Imcr. 17 & 13) 
15. SUB-TOTAL FROM LINE 9 
Ifi, SfRVlCF CONTRACT 
17. 
18. SU8 TOTAL-TAXABLE ITEMS 
19. TRADE ALLOWANCE (Site 10) ; 
(total laws 1 M / ) 
20 NET TAXABLE AMOUNT 
(line 18 annus fam 19) 
21. UTAH SALES/USE (AX ON -JAXABLt AMU IN T 
22. LICENSED REGISTRATION FEES 
HJQ 
-AU& 
a . PROPERTY ASSESSMENT FEE(S) 
2d. STATE INSPECTIOf^EMISSIONS TEST 
25. STATE WASTE TIRE RECYCLINC FEE 
25. FEDERAL LUXURY TAX 
27. DEALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE rt£ 
28. 
29. TOTAL OF ALL ITEMS ABOVE (lines 18,21-27) 
30. TOTAL CREDITS (line 14) 
31. B A L A N C E D U E 
OAY MONTH YEAR 
(Tola! line 29 minus 30) 
-M/fl 
N/a 
j g t a g . ^ i 






• 5 ,83 
-W^ft-
igfe,8Q 
- * / A -
- 3 W r « . 
lft»9.-$3 
THIS SECTION FOR SELLER'S USE ONLY PERTAINING TO TRAOE-IN 
Q Trtto (if not, »xpl»in): 
M l 
Of 1 « U Of iTTCWHCr JTAfCMCKT 
^urnwmnoM 
POR PAYOFF 
NOTICE ONLY TO BUYERS OF USED VEHICLES 
The in*omwi«on you jef on lot window lorm {8uycr's GUKJC| /or ihis vehicle ts pan of ihio contract 
Information on Ihc window lorm overrides any contrary provisions ID (he contrwci of snu*. 
\ HAVE WLCCWSO A COPY OP THE PTC uSfeU C-AH RUY VMS liUtOfc. 
X 
FINANCING DISCLOSURE 
INSTRUCTION. Ono of UtO Iwo loikr^KKj <AwJ«iiufvs, »»itrw»f "A" nr *8". musl be acknowl«lgcrJ. II 
Pwcta**i 4tyv** (u b»» f«sponM(»i<; ktt fVwiong. or i< this is 3 cash-onry or cash-piufc.itacl«-«» wily 
h-mi.<wction. Hi».n Pii^n^Mr nn«t sign d*sdosurc 'A*. K Sdter ao/o« to a/raj'ige h> hn-wc**}. Ih-^i hrvi-
S e ^ ' VKJ Puctnuer musi sion disclosure TT. OY SIGNING. PUHCHASER APFIRMSTHAT HE/SHE 
HAS READ THE DISCLOSURE ANO AGHfcES TTH6R6TO. If SIGNING PiSCLOSURE "8", DO 
NOT SfGN UNTIL ALL BLANKS HAVC SEEN FILLED W. 
PURCHASER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING 
"(A)" THE PUROlAStH OV THe MOTClfl VFHir.LE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTRACT ACKNOwi-
kOG€S THAT THg seu Efl Of THE MOTOR VEHKSLL* HAS MADE NO PROMISES. WARRANT!?? 
OR R6PR£S€KTAT10N5 nEGARWNG SCLLERS A8lUTy lO OtiTAiN FINANCJNG FOR THE 
PUPCHASE OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE. FURTH6HM0«£, ^UHCMA^Ep UNOERSTANOS THAT IF 
F1NANONG IS N€C£S3A«Y IN OHOER FQR THE PURCHASEn TO COMPLCTt Tl \£ PAYMtM 
T£RMS OW IH i i CU^IRACT AH. TH£ F^NANCMG ARRANGCW£MTS ARC. m e sexg ReypoN-
SI8ILTY OF THE PURCHASER 
dGNATliSC 
or pupawsefc . 
SELLER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING 
-(B)" H<t KIHCHAicR OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONIHACT HAS 
EXECUTED TIC CONTHACt IN HtLWNCE UPON THE SELLER-S RJEPRCSCNTATJON IHAI 
SELLER CAW PROVIOC TINANCING AHHAN<;FMFNT.S FOR THE PURCHASE Of THE MOIOH 
VEHICLE. THE PRIMARY TERMS Of T) )E KINANUN(» ARE AS FOI i.OWS. 
INTERCST RAfk bhIWtbN UU& Mn ** TER/WNUM. TCPM UklWfetN 
j ^ y q MONT) IS ANO MONTHS. MONTHLY PAYMENTS 
OETWHENo . . .3JXQ PER MONTH AA/rj 5 PtH MONfH 6A-ScD 
ON A OOWN PAYWFNT OF J . _ l ^ Q . ^ Q 
IF S P ' ER IS NOT ABIE TO ARRANGL J INANUNG WITHIN THE TERMS niSClOSEO. THEN 
SELLER MUST. V/1TI UN X'/EN CALbNUAH OAY? OF THF nATE OF 5ALE MAJL NOTICE TO Tl IC 
PURCl IASCR IHAI I It/SHfc HA.'-'. NOT BFPN ARl r TO Af^ RANGE rWANCWG. PUHCl lASfcH THEN 
HAS 14 UAYS FROM DATE Of SALE TO aECT. IF HCWC CHOO'Jbi. »U HES'OINO THF 
CONTRACT Of SALE, PURSUANT TO SECTION 41-3-W1 
IN OR0ER TO RESQNO THE CONTRACT OF SALE, TH£ PURCHASER SHALL 
(1) RETURN TO SELLER THE MOIOH VfcWCLc RJHCHAS'tD: 
(L») PAY Tl/E SLLUH 30 CENTiJ FOR EACH MILE TH€ MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVDN ANO 
Pf CCWHW^ATE SELLHH F(}fl ANY PHYSK>L DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR VQHCLL 
IN RFnjrifH. SELLER SHALL GIVC 0AO TO IHfc. PUHCHAS6R ALL PAYMENTS OR OTHER 
CONSIDERATION PAJO 0Y Ti l t KjHCHASSH. IPKIIIDING ANY DOWN PAYMENT ANO ANY 
MOTOR Vfc'l l lCU IKA06D IN. IF THE TRAOF-lN HAS BEEN SOLO OR OTIICRWISE DlSPOSbU OF 
BEFORE THE PURCHASER RF5CINnS THE TRANSACTION. THEN THE SklLHH SHALL R6711RN 
TO THE PURCHASER A SUM EQUIVALENT TO THE ALLOWANO: rOWARO THE PURCHASE 
TRICE GIVEN 8Y THE SCLLCR TOR Tl Ik* I HAUk-IN. AS NOTED IN THE OOCUMENT OF SALE. 
SIGNING THIS DlSCLOSUHb DOtS NO r PROHIBIT THE PURCHASER FROM SEEKING MS OWN 
riNANCtt^G. 
SKyHATlJW: 
Of pWflCMAvB-K . „ . . 
StONAlVNt 
of stLten . 
OTHER TERMS AGREED TO: 
o e p - ^ e ^ B<^ tented 
NON€ Q A5 FOLLOWS D 
D b ^ V^>^o 
inwr»noa company. Pt*cy i _ y^chasw ros arranged 'm*u«nc» on v«nici« through 
As J staled on ihc nyvse skfc d *w doctimcnL unless Seflcr has grven to Pvichasa an Express Warronty h writing. Scfcr mak«s no WarrarUy. w*& or «wM, w<n iwspwl k> ifw nwchafti^hiry. 
fitness lor parttcutor purpose, or oihcrwisc concerning Ihc vehicle, pans a accessories described hcrcia Unless oth«r*tf« mcfica(*»d in m*»iq, w warranty ^ KmAwi io thai p»ovid«?d by irw 
nwnuladiwf , H wny, 4« «ixpiaifwd J*¥J COndHiODOd 0y ParaOflph 4 on «v» r»v«CM « » f | W 9 0 L 
Purttujw .Kfw; tt»i tlw cortrjd mckjdofc 4« o< lh« uxiis. coixWions and mmntos on oo<h the loco and reverse sido tart, that mis agrwowii ca/wnts d»x3 supwwd»« ai>r pnor aqc««Kn«i< and -a ul 
the d«te herH)< corppfCMn lh« nompUf. «nri «xriiiwv« ^ l«nwi l d lh* l,nns d lh* wgf««ri>«nl ;*«li<>g 10 th% cubj^d UwlU»r« umred hwrijuy. PUROHAiiER 3Y HRW£R EXECUTION OF THIS 
AGREEMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT^3RE HAS READ ITS TERMS. CCWriONS ANO WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE ANO THE REVERSE S»OE HEREOF KfiO HAS RECEIVED A THUE 
COPY OF THIS A^EUENTlA«rt fSJHER AGREES TO PAY THE *BALA*CE DUE" SET FOHTH ABOVfe ON OR 8EFOHE THE DATE S^ClFlEU. 
ia r - KJ^J -\J<. \JZ> . J L O ^ nenr -_y u a y r o r a J- l e Q t 8 0 1 9 7 5 2 6 1 9 P - 0 3 
SELLER/DEALER MOTOR VEHICLE CONTRACT OF SALE 03/04/02 
DEAL #x 1362 DATE 01= SALE 
TDM WflTKINS 
HENRY DAY FORD INC 
3899 S REDWOOD RORD 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
PtjRriustR <; NAME 
2537 EAST 6200 SOUTH 
~ "»TRC6TAO0RCS5 
SRLT LftKE CITY SALT LAKE UT 84121 
CITY 
C8CU27B-1913 
I urcnwsr »nd Co Purcbtj«r<5) il any (b#»v*ft«r f*f»fr«d lo as "Pu 'Ov - « r ) IK rH/y *«jri«< in »>««« ruv t ih« lfi«o*<ng vehld* trom 3«ner/i)e«)«r ln*r«erter ret«»rtd lo at S^lltr") subitct u> 





^ A i f ^ P C R f O N 
V STEVE HFfffif Y.. 
PURCHASE PRICE AND OTHER SUMS DUE 
1 CASH PRICE OF VEHICLE 
2 ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS 
3 
6 TOTAL CASH PRICE (jdci lines 1 5) 
7 ~MFR REBATE $ liZflL 
8 PORTION/REBATE APPLIED TO PURCHASE 







j i z a 
TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS 
'BALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN 










WARRANTY AS TO BALANCE OWED ON TRAD60-IN VEHICLE 
j P u r c f w ^ f w«rr«n<« Thai he/she has g v « n Selle r 4 tru« pay oft amount on any 
vehicle l i u d u i * i dini I M I< it » iiol u u r r u t and & yu.c»fcf U M I I 8 K , »<nwutil stuvwi 
s h w f PurrhavM- wtH p»iy ih*» w r c m 10 S>ll*r on demand 
10 TRAQf- WAILOWANCt 
11 BALANCE OWED ON TRADE-IN* 
12 NET ALLOWANCE ON TRAQE IN (fcne 10 mmus 11) 
U QEIOSIT/CASH DOWN PAYMENT (omrt ami l im 8) 
14 I0TAI CHCOllS 
15 SUB-TOTAL FROM LINE 9 
ttntm \mn 12 & 11) 
1b SERVICE CONTRACT 
17 
18 ^1B T()TAL-TAXABLkJ2fcMS (Urt.il l in«sJ5J/) 
19 TRADE AUOWANLT ftmr 10) | " "
 M / ~ 
20 NET TAXABLE AM0UN1 
(line 18 minus line 19) fc 
21 UTAH SALES-USE TAX ON TAXABLE AMOUNT w/a 
22 LICENSE &REGIS1RATI0N FEES 
23 PROPERTY ASSESSMENT FEE(S1 
94 STATE INSPECTION/EMISSIONS TEST 
25 STATE WASTE TIRE RECYCLING f& 
26 FEDERAL LUXURY TAX 
27 DEALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FCC 
28 
29 TOTAL OF ALL ITEMS ABOVE 
30 TOTAL CREDITS 
(lines 18. ?1-?7)J 
(hnc U) 
31 BALANCE DUE 
DAY MONTH 



















Purchasor has arranged insurance on vehicle through _ 
-G1E*53 
THIS SECTION FOR SELLER'S USE ONLY PERTAINING TO TRADE IN 









NOTICE ONLY TO BUYERS OF USED VEHICLES 
Tho information you sec on ihc window form (Buyer s Guidej for this vehicle is pan; oi ifoi tonifdti 
InfouiwttKin on it M» window lorm overrides any contrary piovtsions m ihc contract ot sole 
I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF THE FTC USFL) CAH BUYERS GUIOE 
FINANCING DISCLOSURE 
INSTRUCTION One of &W h*o tallowing o»scbisnre^ *rt»ie» *A" <W H' musl be 3<-knowiedq«d If 
Purchase sgrws to be responsible lor financing or rf this » a cash onty or c«*.h plus trade-in onl> 
tiim&itdoi itwn Purchase roust &qn o*dosure "A* II Sellor agrees to arrange (or fmartong then both 
5e«er and Purchaser must s»gn d»^ctovife TT" RY SIGNING PURCHASER A F R R M ^ THAT Hg/?He 
HAS REAO THE DISCLOSURE ANO AGREES THERETO IF SIGNING DISCLOSURE "8 ' DO 
NOT SIGN UNTIL A U BLANKS HAVE BEEN FILLfcO IN 
PURCHASER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING 
"(A)' THE PURCHASER OF THE MOTQP VEHICLE DESCRIBED IN THIS CONTHACI ACKNQwi 
EDGES THAT Tl IE SELLER Or THC MOTOR VEHICLE HAS MADE NO PROMISES WARRANTIES 
OR REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING SfcLLfcH'S ABILITY fO OBIAlN FINANCING POH IHfc 
PURCHASE OF THE MQTQR VEH«C1£ FURTHERMORE PURCHASER UNDERSTANDS THAT IF 
FINANCING IS NECESSARY IN OROER FOR THE PURCHASER TO COMPLETE THE PAYMENT 
TERMS OF WIS CONTRACT A U THE FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS ARE THE SOLfc WEAPON 
SWILTY OF THE PURCHASER 
SELLER AGREES TO ARRANGE FINANCING 
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A. They have them in several places across the country. 
Their first one of the year is Las Vegas. The second one is in 
Scottsdale, Arizona. And then the third one is in Palm 
Springs, Florida. 
Q. And you attend some or all of them? 
A. I don't go to Florida, but I go to the others. 
Q. And how long has that — has that been your practice 
to attend those Barrett-Jackson auto auctions? 
A. For years. 
Q. Are those open to the public? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you use automobile auctions in your own dealership 
to buy and sell automobiles? 
A. Yes, we do. 
Q. And do you collect automobiles yourselves? 
A. I have at any one time anywhere from two to four 
automobiles. Right now I have three. 
Q. These are I presume somewhat unusual automobiles? 
A. Yes. Yes. 
Q. Well, let's turn our attention then to the 
transaction that is the siibject of this lawsuit. And it 
revolves as we've heard around your attempt to purchase two 
automobiles from the defendant. Describe the automobile and 
how you came to be interested in trying to purchase it. 
A. In 1966 Ford came out with a race car called the Ford 
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GT40. And it was fabulously successful for the next five 
years. It was the first time that an American car with 
American drivers were able to consistently beat the Europeans 
on their home tracks. For in the car community, it was a proud 
moment for us. 
The car was beautiful. The car was iconic. The car 
was widely acclaimed and famous. 
In December of 2002 to celebrate their anniversary, 
Ford unveiled at the Detroit Auto Show a replica, an updated 
version of this car and called it the Ford GT40. It was 
unveiled in Detroit to wild applause in the car community, 
became instantly famous. The acclaim for it was so great, the 
next month, Bill Ford of Ford Motor Company, announced they 
would build this car in limited numbers. The numbers fainted 
about were something on the order of 3000 cars is all that 
would be built. 
Q. Did, did the information you reviewed on Ford's plans 
indicate when these cars would be built? 
MR. HUGHES: Your Honor, I'm going to object on the 
grounds of hearsay. I've been waiting, and I think the last 
few questions — but we're clearly in the hearsay area. 
THE COURT: You wish to respond? 
MR. WILSON: I'm asking the witness's understanding 
of the history of this automobile, and it goes not to the truth 
of the matter but to explain how it was he became interested 
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Q. What did you understand was Day's obligation if it 
didn't receive any cars? 
A. He had no obligation to me then. 
Q. Between that time and the end of December, 2002, 
first of January, 2002, did you have any communication at all 
with Henry Day Ford? 
A. Not — not until I received the letter. 
Q. Describe that. 
A. We received a letter at my house. It had the check 
in there and the letter said that they were returning my 
deposit because they were not going to receive the cars. 
Q. The letter you refer to and the enclosed check is 
admitted in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the letter says in part, "We regret to inform you 
that our allocation is not going to allow us to receive this 
vehicle." Is this the first you had heard that from Henry Day 
Ford? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you surprised to get this letter? 
A. Disappointed, but not surprised because from the 
outset we knew that there was the possibility that they 
wouldn't get the cars. 
Q. What did you do with the check? 
A. Deposited it. 
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1 MR. HUGHES: And those were the ones that came out of 
2 the file of the court exactly, but just to make sure we're all 
3 on the same page. 
4 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
5 Q. (BY MR. HUGHES) At any rate, sir, you on the motor 
6 vehicle contracts were asking what kind of series car? 
7 A. A Ford GT40. 
8 Q. And the bodty type was what? 
9 J A. Here Mr. Kersey has put in GT40. 
10 Q. Well, you signed this contract, did you not, sir? 
11 A. I did. 
12 Q. So you agreed with that, did you not? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. In fact, if you would for me — well, I'll do it, the 
15 very bottom of the contract it says, "Purchaser agrees that 
16 this contract includes all the terms, conditions and warrantees 
17 on both face and reverse side hereof. And that this agreement 
18 cancels and supersedes any prior agreements. And as of the 
19 date hereof ccomprises complete and exclusive statement of the 
20 terms of the agreement related to the subject matters covered 
21 hereby." 
22 So you read that, did you not? 
23 A. No, I didn't but — 
24 Q. Well, let me ask it this way. How long have you been 
25 filling out these contracts, sir? 
1 A. Many years. 
2 Q. And you knew that was there, did you not? 
3 A. Yes, sir. 
4 Q. You didn't have to read it specifically this time, 
5 correct? 
6 A. Correct. 
7 Q. And you knew that this contract reflected your deal 
8 with Henry S. Day? And then if we look at it, and you actually 
9 called, you've testified, Mr. Kersey and said, "Well, you 
10 forgot to put in purchase for MSRP." Mr. Kersey made that 
11 change, correct? 






And that's Exhibit 2? 
Yes. 
And was Mr. Kersey pretty accommodating in that? 
Very. Yes, sir. 
And was there ever a period, sir, you called and 
18 J said, "I don't want to buy a Ford GT40. I want to buy a Ford 
19 GT." The contract should again be changed"? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. If we look through this contract, sir, you were going 
22 to actually pay more for this vehicle than the MSRP. Isn't 
23 that correct? 
24 A. Yes. 


























Q. Did you sign that deposition, sir? 
A. I'm sure I did. 
Q. Did you indicate when you signed that, that that was 
a mistake, that you misspoke? 
A. No. 
Q. But that was your testimony, sir, that you had seen a 
Ford GT40? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Isn't it a fact, sir, that Ford often takes a car 
into market and markets it and then brings the car back for 
sale with a same name? 
A. Not often, no. 
Q. But they do do that, do they not, sir? 
A. They did in this case. 
Q. Have they done it, for instance, with the Ford Shelby 
car, the Shelby Mustang? 
A. No, not exactly. The early Shelby's were called 
! Shelby 350. For example, they did not reintroduce it as the 
Shelby 350. They reintroduced it as the Shelby. But — 
Q. But they did reintroduce a Mustang again as a Shelby? 
A. Yes, they did. 
Q. Isn't it possible, sir, that Ford could also in the 
future manufacture, produce a Ford GT40? 
A. I guess anything is possible. 
Q. In fact, that wouldn't be inconsistent with some of 
1 Exhibits 1 and 2, line — paragraph 2, if you fail to buy the 
2 car, Henry Day Ford had the right to keep that money, did they 
3 not? 
4 A. Well, I don't know. 
5 Q. And if I can, I'll read that to you, sir. Mine was 
6 upside down. I was being lazy. 
7 "If the purchaser does not pay the balance due by the 
8 I date indicated on the reverse side of this agreement, then the 
9 seller may set off its damages for any cash deposit or down 
10 payment received from the purchaser." Correct? 
11 I A. Correct. 
12 Q. So you as an auto dealer if you are buying, going out 
13 to look for and obtain a car that you don't want to have, you 
14 J want to make sure a person is ready, willing and able to buy 
15 it? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. And if not you would at least have some recourse to 
18 recoup some money? 
19 A. Yes, against our damages. Yes. 
20 Q. I'm going — you and Mr. Kersey agreed to the 
21 thousand dollars? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. And the thousand dollars was part of the contract? 
24 Correct? 
25 A. Correct. 
Q. And, in fact, the thousand dollars was the 
consideration for the contract, was it not? 
MR. WILSON: I'll object to that to the extent it 
calls for a legal conclusion. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. HUGHES: Well, your Honor — 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. HUGHES: — this is part of a request for 
admission, if I may. That question was asked specifically to 
the plaintiff and he has answered that question. 
THE COURT: Do you wish to respond? 
MR. WILSON: Same objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yeah, I think it's a proper objection. 
MR. HUGHES: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. (BY MR. HUGHES) Do you have any reason to believe, 
sir, that they would not have written this contract, Mr. Kersey 
would not have written this contract if you had not deposited 
the thousand dollars? 
A. I don't think he would have written it with — I 
think they would have required a deposit. 
Q. Well, that deposit was important, was it not, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You already testified that you received the deposit 
back, correct? 
A, Correct. 
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Q. And that was in December of 2002, approximately 
eight, nine months after Henry Day held it? Whatever it is. 
Correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Did you call Henry Day and say, "Keep my check"? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you call to object to them returning it to 
them — to you? 
A. No. 
Q. In fact, your testimony was you were just 
disappointed, weren't you? 
A. Correct. 
Q. In fact, you testified earlier, sir, that you thought 
they might be holding your money for many years? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And why did you accept your contract and deposit back 
after just eight or nine months? 
A. Because it was accompanied by a letter saying they 
were not going to get the cars, and that was a possibility from 
the outset. 
Q. You filed a complaint in this matter, did you not, 
sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And have you read that complaint with your attorneys? 
A. Yes. 
GEORGE THOMAS WATKINS - Cross by MR. HUGHES 80 
Q. I reference you to paragraph 20. And I'll just read 
it for you. "Because Ford had not yet begun producing the Ford 
GT, Watkins did not expect to receive delivery of the Ford GTs 
for many months. " 
Was it many months or many years, sir? 
A. We didn't know for sure. We knew it would be many 
months and it could extend to years. 
Q. But your complaint says actually many months. Would 
that be accurate? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You talk about when you went back into Henry Day. 
You met with a person you don't know the name of. 
THE COURT: You have to give an audible answer so 
it's recordable as opposed to nodding your head. 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I didn't hear a question. 
THE COURT: Well, then tell him you didn't — 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I didn't hear a question. 
Q. (BY MR. HUGHES) Do you recall your testimony, sir — 
thank you — 
A. Yes. 
Q. — when you went back to Henry Day and you met with 
someone you don't know the name of? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How do you know — why do you think he was a sales 
manager? 
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1 You certain you went to Henry S. Day for the first 
2 time on March 4th, 2002? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. How are you so sure of that, sir? 
5 A. I only went there one day, and it was the day I wrote 
6 the check and the day that we signed the contracts and the date 
7 on the check and the date on the contracts are on that day, 
8 plus it's my recollection. 
9 Q. At any rate, the contracts that you've just signed, 
10 and let's look at tab 2 that have MSRP, they were never 
11 modified to say Ford GT, were they, sir? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. If somebody came into one of your lots and came to 
14 your office manager and said and demanded a car that they said 
15 they had a contract for but they were demanding a car that was 
16 not represented on the contract, would you have sold it to 
17 them? 
18 A. If I had been on the other side of this agreement, I 
19 would have. Yes, I would have sold them the car. 
20 Q. Would your — would your sales manager have had the 
21 authority to do that, sir? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Did Mr. Kersey tell you specifically that they were 
24 going to be allotted the car during this March 4th meeting 
25 because they were going to win the President' s award? 
A. He didn't tell me they were specifically going to be 
allotted a car. It was — there was a question as to whether 
they were going to be allotted a car at all. But we were aware 
and did discuss, and I did discuss and the other dealers were 
aware of the President's Award. 
Q. But you never discussed that with Mr. Kersey, did 
you, sir? 
A. We did talk about the President's Award. 
Q. Tell me what you recall about that conversation, sir? 
A. Just that there was a President's Award. And they 
have anticipated it was going to play into this somehow, and 
they thought they were going to get the cars. They expected to 
get the car. 
Q. Do you know when Ford decided to allow for a 
percipient, for example, of the President's Award that they 
would be allotted a Ford GT model vehicle? 
A. We have copies of the letter from Ford to Henry Day. 
So if that's what you are talking about, yes, I have seen those 
letters and I am aware of that date. But I was not aware of 
that the day I went in and spoke with Mir. Kersey. 
Q. Have you look, sir, at you just mentioned trial 
exhibit, well, trial exhibits. Would you look at trial Exhibit 
No. 7, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is this one of the letters you were just referring 
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to, sir? 
A. Let's see. Yes. 
Q. Will you look at the background, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It says, "In December we announced the allocation 




Q. So they didn't even announce that and according to 
this letter until December, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so at the time you met in March of 2002, we're 
about two years in front of this letter, are we not, sir? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it says, it continues, "As you recall there were 
three primary ways to earn allotment: The 2003 Share of the 
Nation, and retail car and truck sales, the 2003 President's 
Award winners and Lottery." 
So you wouldn't even know — you wouldn't even know 
if they were awarded one of the President's Award of the 
National Retail Car and Sales Truck Share Award until after the 
2003 year, would they, sir? 
A. I don't know. All I know is as I was calling dealers 
from Ogden down to Provo, they made me aware of a President's 
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Award and that in some way that figured into the allocations. 
That's — 
Q. And when did that happen, sir? When did they tell 
you that? 
A. In March of f02. 
Q. How is it possible for them to have known that, sir, 
if you know? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. And let's go down to purpose while we're on this 
document. 
A. Okay. 
Q. "We're pleased to inform you that your dealership has 
earned one Ford GT based upon your store's Share of the Nation 
retail car and truck sales for the 2003 calendar year." Do you 
know if they allocated any Ford GT model vehicles for any other 
calendar year? 
A. No, I don't know. 
Q. And the next sentence: "Your allocation will be 
scheduled between May 2004 and July 2005." What does that mean 
to you, sir? 
A. That Henry Day will be offered these cars sometime 
between May of '04 and July of '05. 
MR. HUGHES: That's all I have, your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WILSON: 
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Q. Were you offered a Ford GT from Henry S. Day? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was that, sir? 
A. I don't know. Sometime after this. 
Q. Was it in 2005? 
A. It could have been. I was offered it through my 
lawyers. And I don't remember the date. 
Q. Okay. Was it shortly after you went into the 
dealership, sir? 
A. I don't think it was shortly after, no. 
Q. Within a month or two months? 
A. I don't know when. 
Q. What was your answer to the offer to sell you a Ford 
GT, sir? 
A. I declined it. 
Q. And were they offering to sell it to you for MSRP? 
A. Yes. 
MR. HUGHES: Thank you. That's all I have. 
MR. WILSON: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Your next witness, 
counsel. 
MR. WILSON: It will be Steve Kersey. He's outside 
your Honor. 


























Q. What other model GTs have there been? 
A, They had a GT Heritage addition. 
Q. Is it not unusual for Ford — let me back up. Ford 
has manufactured a vehicle known as the Mustang? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it has had different model names for that 
Mustang, has it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has there been a period where they've had a 
particular modeling for Mustang, discontinued that model and 
then brought it out again? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you give us an example, please? 
A. A good example would be the Shelby GT500 produced in 
the sixties, and they now produce that car, similar, you know, 
same name plate. 
Q. Use the same name? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when did it come out again, sir? 
A. I believe it was 2007. 
Q. So is it possible that Ford could yet come out with 
another GT40? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. It wouldn't be inconsistent with what their business 
practices have been in the past, has it, sir? 
1 QQ 
A. No. 
Q. Has Henry S. Day ever had a Ford GT40? 
A. No. 
Q. They've never had one available to sell? 
A. No. 
Q. Ifm going to have you look at Exhibits 6 and 7. And 
before we get into that, do you — Henry S. Day returned to the 
plaintiff his deposit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when about was that, sir? 
A. The end of December 2002. 
Q. And why was that, sir? 
A. I had made a call to Larry Gock (phonetic) , our floor 
rqpresentative on the sales side, and asked him if we would, we 
would receive a Ford GT40. He told me we would not. 
Therefore, the next time we met, we talked about, you know, 
returning that money. And that's what we did. 
Q. What do you remember — was this telephone call with 
Mr. Gock by telephone or in person? 
A. Telephone. 
Q. And when was it, sir? 
A. It was in December. Don't know the exact date. 
Q. Well, what did Mr. Gock tell you specifically about 
whether or not you would be allocated any Ford GT40s to sell? 
A. We wouldn't be receiving a GT40. 


























Q. Did he tell you why? 
A. He didn't. 
Q. After you had that talk with Mr. Gock, did you 
prepare the letter which is Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4? 
A. Yes. We had it prepared. Kelly Hardy, our officer 
manager, did. 
Q. When you wrote that letter, sir, did you believe that 
you would not have a Ford GT40 to sell to the plaintiff? 
A. We did. 
Q. In fact, enclosed in that letter was a check which is 
the second sheet of Exhibit 4? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was that cashed, a check negotiated by the 
plaintiff? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. Between the date or at any point after you sent this 
letter, and it's Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4, up through 2000 — 
let me ask it another way. 
After 2000 — December 2002, when was your next 
conversation with the plaintiff? 
A. It would have been when we had talked on the phone in 
'05. 
Q. Plaintiff never called you to ask you to keep his 
check? 
A. No. 
